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Abstract 
 
In the context of a first Working Paper the authors argued that electricity has a number of 
characteristics that set it apart from other commodities. It was demonstrated that some of 
these characteristics might complicate the deregulation process. This paper analyses the 
ongoing deregulation process in the European electricity sector and attempts to establish 
whether these difficulties can more readily be solved at European level. It would appear 
that some problems, e.g. economies of scale in electricity generation, have less of an 
impact at European level than within smaller national markets. However, a number of 
difficulties have to be overcome before a unified European electricity market can become a 
reality. These include the limited interconnection capacities between Member States. The 
European Commission has taken steps to improve the situation, for example by offering 
financial support for investments and promoting the development of regional markets as an 
interim measure ultimately leading to a fully integrated market. Apart from the difficulties 
related to electricity generation and transmission there are also exogenous factors that 
influence the ongoing deregulation process, e.g. the implementation of the Kyoto protocol 
and the dramatic increases in primary fuel prices. 
This paper argues that a consistent, stable and uniform European regulatory framework 
must be put in place if the impact of these difficulties is to be minimised. 
 
JEL Classification:  L94. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This is the second Working Paper on the ongoing deregulation process of the electricity sector in 
Europe.  
 
The first paper
1 compared the electricity sector to the telecommunications sector and stated that, 
even though there are similarities, the two sectors have some very different characteristics. The 
authors argued that, due to these differences, a successful deregulation in one sector can in no way 
be generalised to the other one.  
 
This second paper discusses into more detail the ongoing deregulation process in the European 
Union.  
 
The deregulation of the European electricity sector was launched on 19 December 1996, the date 
on which Directive 96/92/EC "concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity" was 
adopted. It entered into force two months later, on 19 February 1997. According to the European 
Commission
2, liberalisation aims at increasing efficiency, harmonising and reducing electricity 
prices, improving public services, cutting reserve production capacities, making a better use of 
resources, giving customers the right to choose their supplier and providing customers with a better 
service.  
 
Relying on the experiences of the pioneers - the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom - 
Directive 96/92/EC subdivides the electricity sector into four segments: generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply
3. Generation and supply are opened up to competition, whereas 
transmission and distribution remain monopolistic. The principal requirements of the first Directive 
are:  
 
−  integrated companies must keep separate accounts for transmission, distribution, other 
electricity-related activities and other (non-electricity-related) activities. This separation of 
accounts aims at avoiding discrimination, cross-subsidies and distortion of competition;  
                                                           
1   Coppens F. and D. Vivet (2004). 
2   See European Commission (1998).  
3   For details, see the complete text of Directive 96/92/EC. 2  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
 
−  the generation segment should be opened up to competition, either by an authorisation 
procedure and/or by a tendering procedure
4;  
 
−  transmission and distribution remain monopolies. Non-discriminatory rules on access to the 
transmission and distribution networks should be established. Member States can choose 
between (a) regulated third party access, (b) negotiated third party access or (c) the single 
buyer model
5.  
The transmission system should be operated by an independent system operator (the 
transmission system operator or TSO) responsible for operating, maintaining and 
developing the network and its interconnections.  
As in the case of the transmission system, an independent system operator (the distribution 
system operator or DSO) should be designated to operate and manage the distribution 
network in its area;  
 
−  the supply segment is also opened up to competition; "eligible consumers" are free to 
switch suppliers. Member States can provide their own definition of 'eligible consumer', 
though they have to meet minimum requirements: by 19 February 1999, 26 p.c. of the total 
consumption must be eligible; furthermore, companies consuming over 100 GWh per 
annum are always eligible. By 19 February 2000 this share must be at least 28 p.c. and 
three years later eligible consumers should represent at least 33  p.c. of total national 
consumption;  
 
−  Member States must also designate a competent and independent authority to settle 
disputes relating to the contracts and negotiations. 
 
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the Directive aims at laying down general principles 
to establish a framework and leaves their detailed implementation to the Member States, allowing 
them to choose the regime which corresponds best to their particular situation. 
 
The preamble to the Directive clearly states that, following implementation of the Directive, some 
obstacles to trade in electricity will nevertheless persist, and that, therefore, proposals for improving 
                                                           
4   Under an authorisation procedure, any company may build and operate a new electricity-generating plant, provided 
that it complies with the planning and energy supply criteria for authorisation specified in the Member State in question. 
Alternatively, under a tendering procedure, whenever there is a necessity for new generating capacity on the basis of 
regular long-term planning forecasts, an independent body draws up an inventory for new means of production and the 
requisite capacity is allocated by a tendering procedure. 
5  Under a negotiated third party access system, each network user negotiates the terms of access with the system 
operator. With regulated third party access, the tariffs are set in advance by the relevant authorities, and applied to all 
users of the network. These tariffs are published. Under the single buyer model, eligible customers apply to a legal 
entity which is responsible for central electricity purchasing and selling.  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    3 
   
the operation of the internal market may be made in the light of experience. As such, it did not come 
as a surprise when the European Council of Lisbon in March 2000 called for faster liberalisation in 
the electricity and gas sectors, in order to achieve a fully operational internal market. The main 
issues identified concerned access to networks, tarification, market power in electricity production 
and different degrees of market opening between Member States. 
 
Directive 2003/54/EC, repealing Directive 96/92/EC, was therefore adopted on 26 June 2003. The 
main new features provided by this new Directive can be summarised as follows
6: 
 
−  the timetable for market opening was extended to households. From 1 January 2004 
onwards, all non-households must be free to choose their supplier and three years later all 
consumers should be eligible;  
−  as far as unbundling is concerned, the second Directive requires legal unbundling as well 
as management unbundling for network operators (i.e. TSOs and DSOs);  
−  non-discriminatory access to the transmission and distribution networks is based on ex ante 
fixed access tariffs (i.e. regulated third party access);  
−  as far as generation is concerned, new capacity should be developed through an 
authorisation procedure. This can be extended by a tendering procedure when security of 
supply is at risk;  
−  provisions regarding public service obligations (universal service), environmental protection 
and security of supply are included in the new Directive. Member States' responsibility 
relating to security of supply can be delegated to the regulator;  
−  an extension of the regulator's task (e.g. fixing rules for the use of the interconnection 
capacity, supervision of network access tariffs, overseeing the level of transparency and 
competition, etc.). 
 
Besides these core Directives, the European Commission has also adopted a number of other 
measures, in particular in regard to the environment and cross-border exchanges, which will be 
discussed below.  
 
Summing up, the electricity sector consists of 
− Generators 
−  Transmission system operators; to be split up into 
o  network development and maintenance (including interconnections) 
o  network operation; supply-demand equilibrium, congestion, losses, etc. 
− Distribution  system  operators 
                                                           
6  For details, see the complete text of Directive 2003/54/EC. 4  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
− Suppliers 
 
−  An independent regulator 
−  A market mechanism 
 
In the first section, the concept of unbundling will be treated. The next section handles several 
points related to electricity generation. Power transmission is the subject of the third section. Taking 
a European perspective, distribution will not be touched upon while for transmission the cross-
border flows will be emphasised. Cross border congestion management often makes use of power 
exchanges, as such this topic is also handled in the third section. The final chapter is about 
regulation.  
 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    5 
   
 
2 UNBUNDLING 
As stressed in the preceding paragraph, one of the main changes introduced by the Directives is 
the requirement to unbundle the vertically integrated sector into four segments, i.e. generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply. The rationale is that, unlike generation and supply, 
transmission and distribution are natural monopolies (with network externalities) where, by 
definition, competition cannot be introduced. Consequently, since competitors in generation and 
supply need access to the networks, the electricity Directives have provided the separation of 
competitive from non-competitive segments, in order to avoid discriminatory access and conflicts of 
interest. 
 
Unbundling implies that decisions previously taken within the scope of one firm should now result 
from market mechanisms. Economic theory holds that, while the introduction of competition in some 
subsegments (generation and supply) might create a downward pressure on prices, the increased 
interaction and the need for coordination among participants from different segments could raise 
transaction costs. Whether the overall result will lead to lower or higher prices depends on the 
relative size of the two phenomena
7.  
 
The promoters of electricity deregulation implicitly assume that the downward pressure on prices 
resulting from competition (in generation and supply) will largely compensate for transaction costs 
(resulting from interactions between generation, transmission, distribution and supply). It is 
nevertheless important to note that, if the transaction costs resulting from unbundling are high, the 
overall costs can be reduced by re-integrating, and the pursuit of cost-optimality would generate 
attracting forces among the various segments
8. In that case, problems would arise when these 
unifying forces relate to a (monopolistic) network segment because this might result in a tendency 
toward a re-integrated monopolistic industry.  
 
Although difficult to measure, the transaction costs resulting from the separation of network 
segments from the other segments could be substantial in the case of the electricity sector. This is 
mainly due to the continuous need for coordination among the segments and the ensuing necessity 
of information exchange
9. When these transaction costs are high, countervailing forces - i.e. 
regulation - will be needed to avoid re-integration.  
 
European legislation requires network segments to be legally separated from competitive segments. 
While the principle of unbundling is simple in theory, it can assume a number of forms, allowing 
                                                           
7  In this respect, see Joskow P. (2002) and Coppens F. and D. Vivet (2004).  
8   This mechanism is similar to the cost reduction that results from integration in the case of the existence of economies 
of scale.
 
9   See e.g. Coppens F., D. Vivet (2005).  6  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
different degrees of independence between the unbundled segments. The first Directive essentially 
requested a separation of accounts. This was quickly considered to be insufficient, so that the 
second Directive strengthened the requirements, imposing a legal separation and minimum criteria 
aimed at ensuring organisation and decision-making independence
10. In most Member States, the 
TSO (or TSOs in the case of Germany) today is a legally independent unit. In some cases (e.g. the 
Netherlands, the UK, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, Portugal and Spain), there even is a strict 
ownership separation between the TSO and the competitive players; in most of these cases this 
means that the TSO is state-owned. As far as the DSOs are concerned, the situation is more 
problematic, since only half of the Member States have legally unbundled DSOs
11.  
 
For the competitive segments - generation and supply - a strict separation between the two 
activities is not required by the Directive. In fact, the main development over the past couple of 
years is the substantial wave of acquisitions and mergers that took place throughout Europe
12. By 
reinforcing their positions on both the generation and the supply markets, companies hope to be 
sheltered from market-risk exposure, credit risks and low market liquidity. Suppliers have to buy 
power at uncertain and volatile prices. At the same time, they often have more or less fixed price 
contracts with their customers. One way to eliminate the associated price risk is by (re-) integrating 
with a power producer. Doing so provides the producer with a guaranteed output, implying mutual 
gains. These re-integration movements reduce risk, and as such might have a positive impact on 
costs and prices
13 (and as a consequence they are beneficial to consumers). On the other hand 
there might be a potential for (abuse of) market power. Therefore integration of a producer with a 
supplier often required the producer to sell so-called Virtual Power Plants or VPPs. In Belgium, for 
instance, Electrabel was obliged to auction off 1,200 MW of VPPs in exchange for its subsidiary, 
Electrabel Customer Services, being granted default supplier status. In France, EDF must auction 
off 6,000 MW in exchange for acquiring joint control in the German energy company EnBW. In the 
Netherlands Nuon was asked to auction off 900 MW of VPPs after having taken over Reliant's 
generation capacity. VPPs are explained in box 1. The efficiency of the use of VPP depends on the 
context
14.  
                                                           
10  In terms of organization and decision-making independence, the rules introduced by the Directive 2003/54/EC are as 
follows: 
  - those persons responsible for the management of the transmission system operator may not participate in company 
structures of the integrated electricity undertaking responsible, directly or indirectly, for the day-to day operation of the 
generation, distribution and supply of electricity; 
  - appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the professional interests of the persons responsible for the 
management of the transmission system operator are taken into account in a manner that ensures that they are 
capable of acting independently; 
  - the transmission system operator shall have effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated 
electricity undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. 
11   See Commission of the European Communities (2005b). 
12  Codognet et al. (2001) provide an extensive review of features and rationales of these acquisitions and mergers.   
13   This type of risk hedging is called a physical hedge. The price risk can also be hedged using derivatives (i.e. a financial 
hedge). Efficient financial hedging requires organised derivatives markets and as such entails transaction costs.  
14   For an example in which VPPs are inefficient, see Coppens F. (2005).  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    7 
   
 
Box 1: Virtual Power Plants 
 
Virtual Power Plants are option contracts. The owner of the contract has the right to buy a certain 
amount of energy at a price fixed in the contract (the energy price) during a specified period of time 
in the future (the delivery period). The contract thus fixes the unit price, the quantity and the delivery 
period.  
 
The price of the contract is fixed at an auction. At the auction, the seller (e.g. EDF, Electrabel) calls 
a price. All potential buyers enter bids mentioning the amount (in MW) they want to buy at that 
price. If the total bids entered exceed the total amount offered by the seller, no deals are concluded. 
The price is increased and a new round starts.  
 
After a number of rounds the price is known, as well as the capacity sold. This price is called the 
capacity price.  
 
There is a separate auction for base-load VPP and peak-load VPP.  
 
Summing up, a VPP buyer buys a contract for a number of megawatts at a certain price, or to be 
more precise, he buys the right to use this number of megawatts during a period of time in the 
future, and for each hour he uses them, he has to pay the energy price (fixed in the contract). The 
price paid for the contract is called the capacity price.  
 
The VPP contracts thus have a fixed price (the capacity price). That fixed price gives the owner the 
right to buy electricity at a known price (the energy price) during a predefined period. This means 
that it is 'as if' he had bought a virtual production plant with a fixed cost equal to the capacity price 
and a variable cost equal to the energy price, hence the name.  
 
Example based on the Belgian VPP auction 
The energy price in the Belgian VPP contract is 12€/MWh for VPP base-load. The fifth VPP 
auction
15 yields a capacity price of 17,128€/MW/Month.  
 
Thus, for obtaining the right to use 1 MW of capacity during a certain month in the future, the buyer 
has to pay 17,128€. This does not mean that he actually uses it, since it only gives him the right to 
do so.  
 
                                                           
15   See www.endex.nl/vpp/files/vpp_results_5th_auction.pdf, a weighted average price is used. 8  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
Assuming that he uses this 1 MW during each hour of the month, this means, since there are 
24x30=720 hours in a month, that he pays a fixed price of 23.8€ for each hour he can use that MW, 
plus an additional price of 12€ (the energy price) when he actually uses it. This results in a total of 
35.8€/MWh, assuming he exercises the option for each hour of the month.  
 
 
For the sake of completeness it should also be mentioned that, due to increased (future) use of gas 
for power generation, there is also potential for mutual gains from vertical integration between gas 
and electricity sectors. The production of electricity within such an integrated company reduces the 
risk associated with the volatility of the primary fuel prices; this volatility is expected to increase in 
the future. The gas supplier, on the other hand, is guaranteed a future sales volume and reduces 
the risk of his massive investment costs. In addition, possibilities for price arbitrage are created; the 
gas can be sold on the spot market or used for electricity generation depending on the most 
advantageous commodity price
16.  
 
It is pointed out that there is also a rationale for horizontal integration movement. Horizontal 
integration is motivated both by a search for economies of scale (see chapter 3) and by the desire 
to acquire a position on the various national markets. In fact, exporting to other countries entails 
less (balance) price risks when the exporter has generation capacity in the target market (in that 
case the exporter is not exposed to volatile balancing prices - see also box 3 infra). These cases 
will be discussed in the next section.  
 
                                                           
16  As to the convergence of the gas and electricity sectors, see for example Chauvet N. (2000).  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    9 
   
 
3  ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN EUROPE 
 
3.1  Heterogeneous production facilities 
Table 1 details net electricity generation by primary energy source for some European countries 
and for the EU as a whole. On the whole, conventional thermal sources (coal, gas and oil) are the 
most widely used (55 pct. of electricity generated in EU 25), followed by nuclear energy (31 p.c.) 
and hydropower (11 p.c.), while other renewables (wind and solar energy only) account for hardly 
3 p.c.  
 
Despite the overall dominance of conventional thermal sources, the main point revealed by the 
table is the diversity in the primary fuel mix across European countries. For example, nuclear 
energy is not used in Austria, Italy and Norway, whereas it is the major source in France, Belgium 
and Sweden. As far as hydro power is concerned, table 1 shows that, while being a minor source of 
electricity in most countries, it is very intensively used in Norway, Austria and Sweden. A last 
example referred to is the Netherlands, where conventional thermal energy is far more dominant 
than in the rest of Europe.  
 
TABLE 1  Net electricity generation by primary energy source in Europe (2003) 
  Breakdown by primary energy source (percentages) 
 
Total net electricity 
generation (TWh)  Nuclear  Conventional 
thermal 
Hydro 
power 
Other 
renewables
EU25 2,944.6  31.4  54.8  10.5  2.9 
EU15 2,616.9  32.7  52.8  11.3  3.3 
Austria 57.5  0.0  40.7  57.9  1.4 
Belgium 80.4  56.0  41.2  1.6  1.2 
France 541.6  77.7  10.0  11.8  0.6 
Germany 560.1  27.9  63.2  4.4  4.5 
Italy 279.0  0.0  80.6  15.7  3.8 
Spain 251.4  23.6  53.3  17.1  6.0 
Sweden 132.5  49.4  10.2  40.0  0.8 
United Kingdom  375.0  21.9  75.5  0.8  1.9 
The Netherlands  93.2  4.1  92.0  0.1  3.9 
Norway 106.1  0.0  0.7  99.0  0.4 
Source: Eurelectric 
 
The use of various primary fuels for power generation is justified from a cost perspective (see 
box 2). However the different choices of primary fuel mixes across countries is the result of past 
national choices based on a combination of economic, geographical, geopolitical and/or political 
considerations. An example of geographical considerations is provided by Austria, where, for 10  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
topographical reasons, the Alpine regions and the flow of the Danube river allowed extensive use of 
hydro power stations. As far as geopolitical considerations are concerned, the case of the 
Netherlands is explicit. Since that country is an important natural gas producer, it is not surprising 
that about 70 p.c. of its electricity is produced from gas, as a way to ensure security of supply. 
Finally, the decision whether or not to use nuclear energy, and the sometimes endless debates over 
it, is often based on (geo-) political considerations. The reason for stressing this diversity in fuel 
mixes and arguments underlying it is that is has important consequences in a liberalised generation 
market. This is the subject of the two following sections.  
 
Box 2   Electricity economics 
 
The economics of electricity and the economically optimal production park will be illustrated using 
the Belgian load duration curve (see graph 1).  
 
GRAPH 1  LOAD DURATION CURVE FOR BELGIUM 
 
Source: ELIA 
 
This curve presents the volatility in power demand in the course of a year. It shows that throughout 
the year (see 100 p.c. on the vertical axis) a capacity of 6,000 MW is needed. A capacity of around 
9,200 MW is needed for 60 p.c. of the year. During a very small part of the year (5 p.c.), more than 
12,000 MW is necessary. 
 
In order to decide on the optimum production facilities in economic terms, these findings should be 
compared with the production costs. Graph 3A infra shows that nuclear stations are most efficient, if 
they run at least 5,300 hours per year, i.e. more than 60 p.c. of the year. They are followed by coal-NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    11 
   
fired stations which are most efficient, if they run for more than 39 p.c. of the year. Below 39 p.c., 
gas-fired stations should be used.  
 
Since nuclear plants are beneficial when they run at least for 60 p.c. of the year, and because more 
than 9  GW is needed during the same part of the year, it can be concluded that - on purely 
economic grounds - there is a potential for 9 GW of nuclear capacity. By a similar reasoning there is 
a need for 1.2 GW of coal-fired stations and for 3 GW of gas-fired stations (for the sake of simplicity, 
only nuclear, coal and gas power stations were considered). Belgian power generation capacity 
consists of 5.7 GW of nuclear power, 1.4 GW of hydro power and 8.3 GW of conventional thermal 
power (European Commission (2004)).  
 
Applying the same reasoning to the French load curve (see graph 2), it seems that the cost-optimal 
nuclear capacity for France would be somewhere between 46 GW and 50 GW of nuclear power. 
Compared to the 63 GW of installed French nuclear capacity, it is shown that France has a nuclear 
over-capacity and that it can decrease production costs by exporting nuclear power. Indeed, the 
French nuclear capacity is sufficient for 85  p.c. of the year. From a cost perspective, nuclear 
production during 60 p.c. of a year is optimal. Average production costs can therefore be reduced 
by producing more, as can be seen in graph 3.  
 
GRAPH 2  LOAD DURATION CURVE FOR FRANCE  
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The French production capacity consists of 63.3 GW of nuclear power, 27.3 GW of conventional 
thermal power and 17.9 GW of hydro power (European Commission (2004)).  
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3.1.1 Generation  costs 
As explained in Coppens F. and D. Vivet (2004) the specific characteristics of an electricity system 
(the permanent equilibrium between supply and demand) together with a volatile and inelastic 
demand require important reserve capacities and the existence of sub-segments in the generation 
market (see also box 2). A base-load plant is running most of the year and is characterised by high 
fixed costs and low variable costs. Nuclear power plants and (accumulation) hydro plants are typical 
examples. Graph 3 shows that the costs of nuclear power plants are around 24 €/MWh (running 
8000 h/year). The high fixed costs of this type of plants imply the necessity for high capacity 
factors
17. Peak-load plants, on the contrary, show low fixed costs and higher variable costs. By 
definition it has low capacity factors. Average production costs of a CCGT
18 are 43 €/MWh (running 
3,000 h, see graph 3A). For coal-fired production the average costs amount to 34 €/MWh (5,000 h).  
 
The optimal size of nuclear plants (1  GW to 1.5  GW) is quite high compared to e.g. a CCGT 
(350 MW to 450 MW). Proponents of competitive electricity generation markets often argue that 
scale effects have disappeared with the introduction of the CCGT and that, as a consequence, 
competition can be introduced in electricity generation.  
Their reasoning can be illustrated by two (fictitious) examples, one for a country with a small base-
load (e.g. 5 GW) and another for a country with a relatively high base-load (e.g. 50 GW). When 
nuclear plants are used in the small market, there is a potential for at most 5 nuclear reactors (i.e. 
the size of the base-load market, 5 GW, divided by the optimal size of one reactor, 1 GW). Using 
CCGT generation instead of nuclear plants, there is a potential for 13 CCGT units (using an optimal 
size of 400 MW). The potential number of units in the high base-load market is computed in a 
similar way. The results are 50 units when nuclear technology is used and 125 units when use is 
made of combined cycles.  
It is obvious that the number of units computed as 'market size divided by optimal plant size' is a 
theoretical maximum of competitors. Indeed, advantages related to knowledge- and site-sharing will 
probably result in the grouping of units resulting in there being less competing companies.  
 
This simple example clearly illustrates that the potential degree of competition depends on the 
relative importance of two factors; (a) the market size and (b) the optimal plant size. It also shows 
that - depending on the technology chosen - an oligopoly might be the optimal solution for modest 
markets and that the introduction of competition necessitates a broader context than the national 
market. In other words, integration with neighbouring countries is needed, just as well as sufficient 
interconnection capacities. Uniform legislation within this broader market is the second condition in 
order to create the same level playing field for all competitors.  
 
                                                           
17  The capacity factor is the effective annual production divided by the maximum possible annual production.  
18   CCGT = Combined Cycle Gas Turbine. NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    13 
   
Striving for a larger market in order to enhance competition is an explicit goal of the European 
Commission: "The Community is seeking to create a competitive market for electricity for an 
enlarged European Union, not only where customers have choice of supplier, but also where all 
unnecessary impediments to cross-border exchanges are removed. Electricity should, as far as 
possible, flow between Member States as easily as it currently flows within Member States".
19 
 
Assuming that a base-load plant is running throughout the year (e.g. 8000 hours), it follows from 
graph 3A that the generation costs come to 24 €/MWh for a nuclear plant and to 32 €/MWh for a 
CCGT. The total annual production cost to meet the base-load is computed by multiplying these 
costs by the number of hours (8760) and the required number of megawatts (i.e. the market size). 
Base-load generation costs amount to 1,051 million euro for nuclear generation and to 1,402 million 
euro for CCGT in the small (5 GW) market. Costs are ten times higher in the larger (50 GW) market.  
 
Meeting base-load demand using the smaller sized CCGT allows more generators and as a 
consequence will (potentially) lead to more competition. From a cost perspective point of view (at 
the current state of technology) nuclear production seems cheaper. However, lower production 
costs do not necessarily imply a lower price. This conceptual difference gives rise to so-called infra-
marginal rents which are the subject of the next paragraph.  
 
The foregoing reasoning does not change fundamentally when the environmental effects are taken 
into account. Graph 3B adds 10 €/tCO2 to the production costs of the different plant types. Including 
the cost of environmental externalities increases the generation costs for the fossil power plants. 
Moreover, it changes the dispatch order (see graph 3B). CO2 emissions are negligible for nuclear 
plants; as a consequence, these additional costs do not affect their production costs. Emissions are 
higher for coal-based power productions than for power produced from gas. This implies that 
CCGTs have lower production costs (than coal-fired plants), when CO2 emissions are taken into 
account.  
 
                                                           
19   See European Commission (2004b) p. 3.  14  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
GRAPH 3  AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS OF ELECTRICITY-GENERATING STATIONS 
A. Excluding the costs of CO2 emissions  B. Including the costs of CO2 emissions 
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Source: Coppens F. and D. Vivet (2004), based on data for Finland. 
 
3.1.2 Inframarginal  rents 
The volatile and inelastic electricity demand, combined with the non-storability of electric power, 
necessitates a heterogeneous production park (see also box  2). This heterogeneity in its turn 
implies a stepwise production function. Making abstraction of plant maintenance, this production 
function can be assumed to be the same at each hour of the year. In competitive markets the 
electricity price is determined as the intersection between supply and demand. Demand is however 
very volatile and inelastic so that the demand function is changing continuously.  
 
Graph 4 shows the cost structure of a (fictitious) electricity production system with nuclear, coal-
fired and gas-fired power stations together with demand curves (D0, D1, D2) at different moments (a 
base-load, mid-peak load and peak-load moment). The supply curve is based on the cost data in 
graph  3A. For power stations running 8,000h per year, nuclear capacity costs 24  €/MWh on 
average, coal 34  €/MWh (when running 5,000  h) and gas 32  €/MWh (when running 3,000  h). 
Capacities are indicated on the horizontal axis.  
 
If (volatile) demand is low, e.g. at level D0, then the cheapest capacity (nuclear in the example) is 
sufficient to meet demand and the market price will equal the lowest production costs. If during 
another hour of the year demand shifts to a level D1, the nuclear capacity is no longer sufficient and 
at least one coal station will be needed. This coal station is called the marginal production unit, and 
this marginal unit determines the market price. As a consequence, the market price is higher than 
the production costs of the cheapest technology and (each megawatt of) the cheapest technology NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    15 
   
earns a rent of  (34-24)€ during each hour that demand is between Q0 and Q1. This rent is called an 
inframarginal rent.  
 
The inframarginal rent is even higher when demand increases to level D2. In that case, the marginal 
unit is a CCGT and the market price is driven by the production cost of this type of technology 
(43 €/MWh in graph 4). The infra-marginal rent on nuclear power is computed as (43-24) x number 
of Megawatts of nuclear power x number of hours that each megawatt is used. If the capacity of the 
cheapest technology is low compared to the required base-load capacity, the number of hours will 
be high and these rents can be quite substantial
20.  
Note that at a demand level D2 coal fired stations also earn a rent (43-34)€/MWh.  
 
GRAPH 4  ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
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Due to the intraday demand volatility, most electricity markets divide a day into subperiods (e.g. 
hours or even quarters of an hour). The various subperiods should be seen as different markets (i.e. 
a market for each hour of the day) and the cheapest technology can participate in all markets 
(during hours of high demand as well as during hours of low demand), contrary to the more 
expensive technologies that can only generate a positive revenue in the high demand hours 
(markets). This implies that in peak-demand hours a mixture of technologies is used, whereas the 
output of these technologies is indistinguishable. In each period, all technologies, except the most 
expensive one, earns an infra- marginal rent. Thus a generator disposing of a portfolio of generation 
technologies has an advantage over one that has only a limited technology choice (i.e. not including 
the one with the lowest production costs), especially if the portfolio of the former includes the 
cheaper technology.  
 
                                                           
20   For an illustrative numerical example, see e.g. Coppens F. (2005).  16  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
The possessors of the cheaper technology thus earn a profit above normal in the form of 
inframarginal rents. In a competitive market these rents are not a problem in themselves. Indeed, 
when these margins become too high, competitors will be attracted and more electricity will be 
generated using the cheaper capacity. Free entry is thus a necessary condition.  
 
Newcomers in the base-load segment have two options: constructing new capacity or importing 
cheap power from abroad (in both cases the supply curve is shifted to the right in graph 4). As far 
as new capacity is concerned, the cheapest production technologies seem to be hydro power and 
nuclear power. In hydro power, entry is limited by physical constraints. Nuclear power is a very 
sensitive issue today and new plants are actually forbidden in some countries. This implies that 
owners of such capacity are protected by (physical or legal) entry barriers. The second option, i.e. 
import from neighbouring countries, is also problematic; limited interconnector capacity becomes 
the main problem.  
Moreover the cheapest generation technologies happen to be very capital-intensive. This creates 
an additional financial entry barrier because only companies having the potential to finance these 
huge investments are potential entrants. It is clear that companies profiting from infra-marginal rents 
have an advantage from this point of view.  
 
As a consequence, there are (physical, legal, financial) entry barriers that could be an obstacle to a 
well-functioning competitive (even to a contestable) market.  
 
It is also observed that the inframarginal rents earned on low emission plants increase when 
greenhouse gas emissions costs are internalised for the other technologies. They also increase 
when the production costs of other technologies increase (e.g. due to an increase in primary fuel 
prices).  
 
The inframarginal rents can be reduced by expanding the cheaper technology
21 (shifting the supply 
curve to the right in graph 4) and in that case lower prices could result.  
 
As for the optimal plant size and economies of scale, the existence of inframarginal rents is to be 
considered relative to the relevant market. If one considers the national market to be relevant, the 
heterogeneous production park must also be seen in this context. An example in this respect is the 
Belgian national market where - when seen in isolation - nuclear capacity (5.7 GW) is insufficient to 
meet minimum load (6 GW, see graph 1). This gives rise to inframarginal rents. These rents result 
in biased market power measures like e.g. the Lerner index
22.  
                                                           
21   It is also pointed out that, according to the reasoning in box 2, there is an upper limit beyond which expansion 
becomes economically inefficient.  
22   See e.g. Coppens F. (2005).  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    17 
   
 
3.2 Main  players 
The electricity landscape in Europe is today dominated by less than ten companies, the main ones 
of which are Électricité de France (EDF), E.ON (Germany), RWE (Germany), Enel (Italy), Endesa 
(Spain), Vattenfall (Sweden) and Electrabel (Belgium). More than two-thirds of the European 
production is now controlled by these companies, with 50 p.c. by the first four
23. It should be noted 
that EDF, with a production of just over 480 TWh per year (in 2005), is far ahead of its nearest 
rivals, E.ON and RWE, which each represent less than 230 TWh per year (in 2005). It may be said 
that EDF's lead, while resulting from an expansionist and ambitious strategy, is merely due to the 
fact that historically France has had only one major electricity company, unlike the other large 
European countries, where the sector was divided among several enterprises. In fact, the structure 
of competition today is largely the result of historical and political choices, in particular the decision 
whether or not to favour a so-called national 'champion'. 
 
In this respect, it may be held that the European Directive does not go far enough by leaving the 
Member States too much freedom. In particular, the Directive makes excessive use of the well-
known subsidiarity principle, whereby the European Union does not take action unless it is more 
effective than action taken at national, regional or local level. The result is that the Directive does 
not give precise instructions as to the organisation of the generation market (or other segments of 
the electricity sector), leaving the door open to variations in national implementing provisions. More 
generally, as underlined by Boisseleau F. and R. Hakvoort (2003), "The restructuring process has 
focused on legal and organisational issues, but did not contain specific prescriptions for economic 
design of the market". This situation is essentially due to the fact that the Directive is a compromise 
reached between several and sometimes opposing parties concerned. Moreover, these disparities 
are naturally reinforced by the diversity of systems which prevailed before the deregulation, in 
particular as far as the structure of ownership or the degree of vertical integration are concerned
24. 
 
3.3  Concentration on national markets 
Due to the limited interconnection capacities, the relevant market is sometimes defined as the 
national market, and concentration measures are often computed with respect to the size of the 
domestic market. It is questionable whether this is in line with the creation of a single European 
market.  
 
Market shares within the national (generation) markets are shown in table 2. All in all, the share of 
the biggest producer remains quite high, with peaks at 85 p.c. in Belgium and France. As regards 
the top 3 producers, their cumulative share exceeds 60 p.c. in most countries, with the exception of 
the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries (considered as a whole). The benchmarking report 
                                                           
23  Jamasb T. and M. Pollitt (2005). 
24  On this diversity, see for example Bergougnoux J. (2000). 18  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
from the European Commission (2003b, 2005b) emphasises that the electricity market in many 
Member States is dominated by one or two companies. This lack of competition would be less 
important if national markets were really integrated into a single European market. But the scope for 
cross-border trade is still inadequate for most European countries (see below). In the light of the 
points raised in 3.1.1, these findings should be linked to market size and efficient plant scale 
implying that for instance the 85 p.c. of the largest producer's market share for Belgium and for 
France should be seen in relation to the size of the Belgian and the French market. Whether or not 
there are inframarginal rents should also be analysed within the scope of the relevant market.  
 
TABLE 2  Generation market structure 
 (percentage  points) 
  Largest producer share  
by capacity 
Top 3 producers 
cumulative share  
by capacity 
Austria  45 75 
Belgium  85 95 
France  85 95 
Germany  30 70 
Italy  55 75 
Spain  40 80 
United Kingdom  20 40 
The Netherlands  25 65 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway  15 40 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2005). 
 
 
3.4  Uncertainty, investment and security of supply 
 
3.4.1 Uncertainty  and  investment 
The deregulation process has increased the uncertainty in various ways: uncertainty over sales 
prices, uncertainty over quantities sold and regulatory uncertainty. The uncertainty is aggravated by 
other events such as the internalisation of externalities (the Kyoto protocol), uncertainty over prices 
of primary fuels, etc. 
 
These uncertainties might slow down investments, particularly in reserve capacities. Before 
deregulation, reserve capacities were considered excessive and therefore inefficient
25, but there is 
no guarantee that the deregulated market will optimise the reserve capacity
26. Moreover, due to the 
                                                           
25  See for example International Energy Agency (2002) or Maloney M. (2001). 
26   See for example Brunekreeft G. and T. McDaniel (2005a), L. de Vries and R. Hakvoort (2004), B. Esnault (2002), 
International Energy Agency (2003b), Meade R. (2005). NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    19 
   
long lead times in power plant construction, a capacity shortage problem cannot be solved in the 
short term.  
 
In addition to the unavailability of traditional market clearing mechanisms for electricity — such as 
delivery delay or substitution of other goods — these problems make observers worry about the 
outbreak of boom and bust investment cycles
27. For instance, A. Meier (2004) from the International 
Energy Agency, notes that the deregulation and market liberalisation have rendered the electricity 
supply system more vulnerable to unusual weather events or other disruptions. The notorious 
Californian electricity crisis in 2001, which was caused in part by insufficient generation capacity 
and which resulted in a wave of blackouts throughout the State, as well as numerous shortfalls 
recently encountered by liberalised markets (Sweden, New Zealand, Italy, North America, ...), 
provide grounds for this scepticism
28. While most markets were considered to have excess 
generating capacity at the time deregulation was launched in Europe, a combination of demand 
growth and low investments has led to a significant decrease in reserve capacities so that in most 
European countries new plants will be needed in the very near future in order to ensure security of 
supply. This is clearly apparent from UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of 
Electricity) system adequacy forecasts, which conclude among other things that: 
•  the period 2007-2010 shows an accelerating decline in generating capacity margins; 
•  at the beginning of the period 2010-2015, if no investment decisions are taken beyond those 
already decided on by transmission system operators, reliability of the UCTE system as a 
whole can be considered at risk
29. 
 
These conclusions for the whole UCTE area have to be supplemented by a focus on the various 
geographical blocs, which may be connected by transmission links of limited capacity. In that case, 
the potential insufficiency in a country cannot be compensated by a potential surplus in 
neighbouring countries. In this respect, the European Commission points out (in a non-binding 
document) that "in the peripheral markets of Ireland, Scandinavia, Italy, Greece and the Iberian 
Peninsula, a trend towards capacity insufficiency is visible at times. It is conceivable that generation 
inadequacy will develop in the core UCTE market as well, if no adequate measures are taken."
30  
 
Translating the acknowledgement of an impending shortage, Directive 2003/54/EC introduced 
provisions specifically devoted to the security of supply issue:  
                                                           
27  As to the risk of boom and bust cycle in electricity, see in particular The Boston Consulting Group (2003). Booms are 
periods of underinvestment and rising prices and profits, followed by busts, which are periods of overinvestment and 
falling prices. 
28  As to the California electricity crisis, see for example The Brattle Group (2001). For a list of shortfalls throughout the 
world, see International Energy Agency (2005). 
29  See UCTE (2005). UCTE co-ordinates the interests of transmission system operators in 22 European countries, 
including 17 Member States of the European Union. 
30 European  Commission  (2004). 20  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
−  Member States are required to monitor the demand/supply balance on the national market, 
the level of expected future demand and additional capacity being planned or under 
construction;  
−  if market-based mechanisms are insufficient to avoid capacity shortages, Member States 
are required to cover the deficit by organising a tender
31.  
 
3.4.2 Demand  side  management 
The Directive also enables Member States to take measures to improve energy efficiency and 
demand side management. This policy area has long been neglected but, due to continuous 
demand growth and increased tensions on the generation side, it has attracted far more interest in 
recent years. The effects of demand side management measures may be summarised as in 
graph 5, which represents two fictitious load duration curves. The load duration curve 1 is the curve 
before measures, whereas the load duration curve 2 is the one after measures. The effects 
expected are both a shift of the curve towards the left and a reduction in the peak load demand. The 
first effect can notably be obtained through energy efficiency policies, such as the promotion of 
appliances and buildings which consume less electricity; substantial savings can, for instance, be 
achieved thanks to energy-saving light bulbs or improvements to stand-by modes on appliances
32. 
The second effect is to be achieved by improving demand responsiveness. The aim is to increase 
demand elasticity by encouraging and enabling consumers to respond to market conditions. 
Extension of new options for electricity retail, such as real-time and day-ahead pricing or 
interruptible rights, have significant potential for alleviating peak-load tensions
33. On the whole, 
demand side management can have a beneficial impact not only on security of supply, but also on 
price volatility, greenhouse gas emissions and consumers' bills. 
 
Finally, the graph shows that base-load demand may increase as a result of demand shifts, due for 
instance to more household appliances functioning overnight.  
 
                                                           
31   This responsibility can be delegated to the regulator.  
32  See Commission of the European Communities (2005a) and International Energy Agency (2001). An energy-saving 
light bulb uses five times less current than a standard one. Stand-by mode electricity consumption, which accounts for 
10 pct. of residential electricity demand, could be reduced by about 75 p.c. by using cost-effective technologies and 
design changes. 
33  As to demand responsiveness, see for instance International Energy Agency (2003a), Energy SA (2001) or Turvey R. 
(2003). Interruptible rights pertain to the imposition of load reductions on consumers up to agreed amounts when 
called for, in exchange for reduced demand charges. Real-time and day-ahead pricing have already been implemented 
for large consumers in numerous countries. However, the situation is different for small consumers, as to which the 
installation of a smart meter still seems too expensive to most suppliers. One can, however, refer to EDF's Tempo 
tariff, in which prices vary according to days and hours. On a display unit, consumers can follow a colour indicator for 
the day, days being distinguished according to price (blue for low, white for medium and red for high), together with an 
indication of whether the hour is currently one of eight off-peak hours or not. Each evening from 8 p.m., customers can 
check the colour of the following day.  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    21 
   
GRAPH 5  EXPECTED EFFECT OF DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT ON LOAD DURATION CURVE 
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3.4.3 Primary  fuels 
An issue that is closely related to the security of electricity supply - but beyond the scope of this 
paper - is the supply of primary fuels. It is only briefly dealt with.  
 
Power can be generated using a diversity of primary fuels: gas, coal, nuclear, oil and renewables.  
 
Gas turbines (CCGT) are characterised by low capital costs and relatively low CO2 emissions. Their 
variable costs are high compared to their fixed costs. The primary fuel costs (the gas price) are 
expected to rise and to become more volatile in the future
34. This is due to the increased demand 
for gas, while in the same time gas reserves will run out and become more concentrated in more 
faraway regions. Reserves are often compared to the current production levels through the so-
called R/P ratio. The R/P ratio of natural gas reserves is 66 years
35 meaning that, at current 
production levels, the known reserves are sufficient for another 66 years of gas production. This 
assumes that current production remains constant during the next 66 years. Gas reserves are 
concentrated, as is seen by the fact that three countries (Russia, Iran and Qatar) hold more than 
half of these reserves.  
 
Coal-fired stations have high capital costs, but relatively low and stable primary fuel costs. Coal 
reserves are abundant (the R/P ratio for coal reserves is more than 200 years)
35. Their main 
disadvantage is the high greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
                                                           
34   See e.g. International Energy Agency (2004b). 
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Nuclear plants have very high investment costs but low variable costs. Three European countries 
have decided on a nuclear phase-out, namely Germany, Belgium and Sweden; other countries (e.g. 
France and Finland) plan to increase their use of nuclear power.  
Uranium reserves are sufficient for at least 85 years of production (at current production levels)
36. 
 
Oil is only marginally used in power generation and is also characterised by volatile and increasing 
prices. Currently known oil reserves will be depleted within about 40 years (at constant 2002 
production levels).  
 
Renewables have high fixed costs but negligible variable costs. They have no CO2 emissions. Their 
potential often depends on climatic (wind) and/or geographical (hydro) circumstances. Fuel cells, 
solar, tidal and wave energy have some potential in the mid- to long-term future.  
 
3.5  The Kyoto Protocol and its impact on the electricity sector 
Reflecting the worldwide acknowledgment of the dangers of global warming, the Kyoto protocol was 
adopted in 1997 by member countries of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The Protocol's major feature is that it sets mandatory targets for greenhouse gas 
emissions for those of the world's leading economies which have signed the Protocol. These targets 
range from -8 p.c. to +10 p.c. of the countries' individual 1990 emission levels. The ultimate goal is 
to reduce the overall emissions by at least 5 p.c. below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 
to 2012. For almost all countries — even those set at +10 p.c; of 1990 levels — the limits call for 
significant reductions in projected emissions. Future mandatory targets are expected to be set for 
commitment periods beyond 2012. All in all, the Kyoto protocol results in assigning a monetary 
value to the earth's atmosphere.  
 
With respect to the Kyoto protocol the European Union is seen as one zone, its reduction target 
being -8 p.c. This overall European reduction target was translated by the European Commission 
into national reduction targets for each Member State ranging from -28  p.c. for Luxembourg to 
+7  p.c. for Portugal
37. Member States have had to establish national allocation plans assigning 
emission rights to individual plants in power- and heat-generating sectors and in energy-intensive 
industrial sectors. 
 
Although there are noticeable variations from one country to another (due to the differences in 
production facilities), electricity generation accounts for a significant share of greenhouse gas 
emissions in the European Union, with an average of 26 p.c. of CO2 emissions in 2002
38. This 
                                                           
36   International Atomic Energy Agency (2004).  
37  The US's reduction target is -7 p.c. Japan's is -6 p.c., just as Canada's. The Russian Federation has to stabilise its 
emissions (0 p.c.) and Australia is allowed to emit more (+8 p.c.).  
38  International Energy Agency (2004a). NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    23 
   
automatically makes electricity one of the sectors in which action has to be taken in order to meet 
the protocol targets. The main implication for the electricity sector is that the external costs 
produced by power stations emitting greenhouse gases (i.e. conventional thermal stations), are 
going to be internalised by producers to reflect the costs of global warming. On the electricity 
production side, this raises two main questions.  
 
Firstly, green electricity has to be encouraged. In this respect, the European Union has adopted a 
Directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources
39. This Directive 
sets a target of 21 p.c. for the share of green electricity in total European electricity consumption by 
2010. In 2001, this share amounted to 15.2  p.c., of which four-fifths came from hydro power
40. 
National indicative targets were set and, in order to achieve them, Member States have developed 
a variety of support schemes aiming to encourage green electricity generating plants, such as 
guaranteed prices, tradable green certificates or fiscal measures. In the present state of technology, 
wind-generated electricity is by far the most likely means of meeting the European targets. 
 
Secondly, the Kyoto protocol puts the spotlight on the debate on nuclear electricity. In fact, nuclear 
electricity is a source not producing greenhouse gas emissions, so that Kyoto will not cause 
additional costs
41. And, unlike wind power, nuclear power production does not depend on 
climatological circumstances. Some studies show how nuclear electricity might help to facilitate the 
achievement of the Kyoto protocol targets
42. At this level, it should be emphasised that uncertainty 
or indecision is worse than a controversial decision, because such a situation may seriously hinder 
or divert essential investments in generating capacity
43. A stable regulatory framework, as well as a 
uniform decision at the European level, would help producers to plan and optimise their production 
plants. 
 
In conclusion, the dangers linked to the global warming phenomenon, and their reflection in the 
Kyoto protocol, put another constraint on electricity production, yielding an advantage for 
competitors based in countries producing intensively from green or nuclear sources. As shown in 
table 3, electricity producers are not equal as regards the Kyoto Protocol. The competitor with the 
most obvious advantage is EDF, whose carbon intensity, owing to its extensive use of nuclear and 
auxiliary hydro power, is very low.  RWE, on the contrary, is the electricity supplier producing by far 
the largest volume of emissions in Europe, with a carbon intensity nearly seven times higher than 
that of EDF. In fact, RWE produces a significant percentage of its electricity from coal, which is the 
source which emits the most CO2. Enel also has substantial emissions due to the proportion of 
                                                           
39  See Directive 2001/77/EC. In addition to the goal of meeting Kyoto protocol commitments, the Directive also aims at 
guaranteeing security of electricity supply, as green electricity is not dependent  on imports. 
40   Commission of the European Communities (2004). 
41   The Kyoto protocol does not deal with the problem of nuclear waste. 
42  See for instance Commission of the European Communities (1999). Gusbin D. and B. Hoornaert (2004). 
43  For Germany, see for example Brunekreeft P. and S. Twelemann (2005). 24  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
conventional thermal power plants in its production facilities. Between these extremes there is a 
group composed of E.ON, Vattenfall and Electrabel, whose more balanced production facilities 
result in an intermediate carbon intensity. Finally, the Norwegian company Statkraft, producing 
exclusively from hydro power, emits no CO2 into the atmosphere.  
 
It should be pointed out that the figures mentioned are not an accurate reflection of the relative 
efforts that the companies will have to make in environmental terms, because European countries 
have not been assigned the same emission reduction targets. This might distort competition.  
 
TABLE 3  CARBON INTENSITY OF MAIN COMPETITORS (2002) 
Companies Generation  (TWh) 
(a) 
Emissions  
(thousands tCO2) (b) 
Carbon intensity 
(b) / (a) 
EDF 558  56,573  101 
E.ON 191  64,160  336 
RWE 183  127,046  694 
Vattenfall 166  68,283  411 
Enel 136  75,000  551 
Electrabel 115  44,481  387 
Endesa 113  59,471  528 
Statkraft 49  0  0 
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003a). 
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4 TRANSMISSION 
As pointed out in the introduction, TSOs are responsible for (1) the maintenance and development 
of their transmission networks as well as the interconnections with neighbouring networks, but also 
for (2) the operational management of their networks.  
 
This section will focus on the cross-border transmissions from a European perspective and will 
therefore primarily deal with the interconnection capacities. Topics such as transmission losses, 
congestion management, and demand/supply balancing will also concentrate on cross-border 
exchanges.  
 
This paper will try to show that electric power transport can not be compared to transport of other 
commodities. This is due to the fact that electricity has some very specific physical characteristics 
(like the occurrence of loop flows and transport losses). As a consequence, coordination of 
transport networks will be required but this will also have an impact on the geographical spread of 
the generation capacity.  
 
The operational management of the network requires close interaction with other market 
participants. In a deregulated market this interaction is supposed to take place through a market 
mechanism, which is therefore also discussed here. Another reason for including the market 
mechanism in this chapter is that, in most countries, the electricity exchange is a subsidiary of the 
TSO.  
 
4.1  Market mechanism - Electricity prices 
 
4.1.1 Power  exchanges 
The main goal of liberalisation is to reduce and to harmonise electricity prices throughout Europe. 
Price movements therefore have to be carefully monitored in order to assess the effects of 
liberalisation. Since bilateral contract prices are confidential, prices can only be monitored through 
power exchanges, which have mushroomed over recent years in Europe. Although the volumes 
traded have increased continuously since these exchanges were created, they are still relatively 
small, and in most countries represent less than 10  p.c. of total electricity consumption (see 
table 4). The only exception is the Nordic market where around 30 p.c. of all the power consumed is 
traded at Nord Pool. Without underestimating the success of Nord Pool, it should be mentioned that 
this high figure is partly due to the fact that all cross-border power trade in the Scandinavian 
countries must take place at Nord Pool
44.  
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TABLE 4  Electricity exchanges - volumes traded on the spot market 
Country  Exchange name  Volume on exchange 
(p.c.) 
Belgium 
(*) Belpex  - 
Nordic Countries  Nord Pool - Elspot  30-40 
The Netherlands  APX  10-15 
France Powernext  5 
UK UKPX  10 
Germany EEX  10 
(*) Planned for 2006  
Sources: APX, EEX, Powernext 
 
Most exchanges work on a day-ahead basis. This means that any participant wishing to supply 
electricity the next day has to send his supply curve for each hour of the next day to the exchange 
authority. Every participant wishing to buy electricity has to send in his demand curve. The 
exchange authority aggregates all individual supply and demand curves and determines an 
equilibrium price for each hour of the following day. These are called the spot prices (for more 
details, see box 3).  
 
Box 3: Power exchanges
45 
Due to the specific characteristics of electric power, power exchanges usually consist of multiple 
submarkets. Depending on the maturity of the exchange, some of these submarkets may be 
lacking.  
 
There are markets for physical delivery (day-ahead market, fine-tuning market and balancing 
market) and financial markets (futures and options).  
 
The day-ahead market mainly serves planning purposes. Before a certain closing hour L of a 
particular day D each producer has to submit price/quantity pairs, indicating the amount of power he 
intends to inject into the network at a certain price for each of the 24 hours of the following day 
(D+1). Likewise, buyers have to submit price/quantity pairs for each hour of (D+1), indicating the 
amount of power they intend to buy at that price.  
After the closing hour, the power exchange aggregates all supply and demand curves and 
determines the equilibrium price. This yields one equilibrium price and quantity for each hour of the 
next day. All transactions are settled at the equilibrium price, called the system marginal price 
(SMP) or the market clearing price (MCP). Graph 6 provides an example from APX.  
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GRAPH 6  Aggregated supply and demand at APX on 22.11.2005 for hour 14 
 
Source: APX 
 
Since the day-ahead equilibria are based on one-day-ahead expectations, and because real-time 
consumption and production depend on a lot of unpredictable factors (weather conditions, plant 
breakdown, etc.), some exchanges allow market players to fine-tune their expectations until a few 
hours before actual delivery. The same mechanism allows them to enter bids and offers, although 
their size  should be relatively small. This market is called the fine-tuning market.  
 
In real time, during the hour of actual delivery, it is the TSO that is responsible for the overall 
balance between supply and demand. In the case of an imbalance, the TSO has to correct. If there 
is excess demand, then the TSO must increase production or decrease demand. In order to do so, 
the TSO must use the balancing market, or sign long-term contracts with producers, or conclude 
interruptible contracts with consumers.  
The TSO can delegate responsibility for this balancing to so-called Balance Responsible Parties 
(BRPs). In that case, any producer or consumer having access to the transmission network must 
designate a BRP. Each BRP is responsible for its own overall balance, and the TSO regulates the 
network balance. In other words, balancing is hierarchical. BRPs and TSO have access to the 
balancing market. If the TSO has to intervene, it will analyse which BRP caused the imbalance and 
ask for a cost compensation. BRPs having their own production plants can use these in order to 
insure their own balance. If they do not have their own production units, they will be exposed to the 
very volatile balancing market price.  
NB: power importers also have to designate a BRP.  
 
Options and futures markets can be used to hedge against price risks, although some people doubt 
whether options and futures markets are appropriate for non-storable products (see Geman H. 28  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
(2002)). They argue that models for derivatives markets implicitly assume that the underlying 
commodity is storable. This might explain why these derivatives are more successful in the 
Scandinavian markets, where there are plenty of (accumulation) hydro power plants available.  
 
All these submarkets are illustrated in figure 1.  
 
FIGURE 1  SUBMARKETS ON A POWER EXCHANGE 
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In real time, producers and consumers can participate in the balancing market. They can enter bids 
to increase/decrease their production/consumption at a certain price.  
The counterparties are the TSO and/or the Balance Responsible Parties which can, of course, also 
conclude contracts with producers for additional power, if needed, or conclude interruptible 
contracts with consumers.  
 
Bids and offers for the near future are entered in the day-ahead (spot) market, and for the very short 
term in the fine tuning market. The data on the bids is accessible to the TSO in order to check for 
network congestion. As the prices are equilibrium prices, imbalances cannot occur.  
 
For the longer term (from weeks to several years), producers and consumers can hedge their 
positions by using options and futures.  
 
4.1.2 Electricity  prices 
Graph 7 shows the movement in bulk electricity spot prices on two European power exchanges: 
EEX (Germany) and Powernext (France). The main conclusion to be drawn from the graphs is that 
bulk electricity prices have tended to rise since the beginning of the millennium. There are various 
explanations for this increase. Firstly, oil, gas and coal prices have risen considerably in recent NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    29 
   
years, pushing up production costs. Second, the implementation of the Kyoto protocol, and the new 
costs associated with it, are also anticipated. These two factors are irrespective of the liberalisation 
process and are generally held to have a substantial impact on electricity price levels. However, 
since their impact cannot be quantified, it is impossible to get an idea of how prices would have 
moved otherwise. As such, the impact of liberalisation on prices cannot be measured precisely. 
Another explanation for the upward trend is related to the decline in surplus capacity (due mainly to 
the increasing demand) and the need for new investments, which are progressively reflected in 
prices, particularly during high-demand periods. This price increase may be seen as a sign that the 
market is functioning well, since it rightly sends a signal encouraging generators to invest in new 
plants. Finally, it is suggested that market power problems may lead to price manipulation but clear 
evidence in this respect is not available.  
 
The graphs also show that electricity prices are very volatile with high spikes. Price volatility is an 
inherent characteristic of electricity prices and is a direct consequence of the volatile but inelastic 
demand and the non-storability of the product.  
 
GRAPH 7   ELECTRICITY SPOT PRICES ON EEX AND POWERNEXT  
  (MOVING AVERAGE ON 30 DAYS) 
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As far as EEX and Powernext are concerned, two main spikes can be identified, the first one 
occurring during the summer of 2003 and the second one during the winter of 2005. At first glance, 
the peak prices during the scorching hot summer of 2003 may seem surprising: in fact, even though 
electricity consumption was higher than normal in summer — mainly because of heavy use of air 
conditioning — it was still far below the winter peaks. But, as in every summer, numerous nuclear 
reactors were shut down for maintenance reasons. Moreover, due to the high temperature, many 30  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
stations were unable to operate at full capacity because of cooling problems
46. Lastly, the persistent 
drought had lowered hydro power potential. This combination of circumstances led to the highest 
electricity spot prices ever. As far as the March 2005 spike is concerned, it coincided with a cold 
spell which was abnormal in its intensity
47, its length and its period of the year. Tensions were 
particularly apparent on the French, Italian and Spanish markets. In France, according to André 
Merlin, Director of RTE (the French transmission system operator), this cold snap would not have 
been a problem, if it had happened in January, but in March, as every year, many plants had been 
shut down for maintenance and fuel reloading
48. In addition, in order to trim demand peaks, EDF 
had contracted interruptible rights during the winter on about 800,000 customers. But, as such, a 
late cold snap was exceptional, 19 of the 22 contractual days had already been used up by the end 
of February, so that this additional tool was not available to curb the peak demand in March. As a 
consequence, electricity had to be imported from Germany and Spain during this period. On EEX, 
whereas supply was sufficient to cover demand, prices increased by contagion. 
 
In conclusion, one can see that electricity prices are strongly influenced by factors irrespective of 
liberalisation. On the one hand, primary energy costs and Kyoto protocol rules have pushed prices 
upwards for several years. On the other hand, climatic constraints are a permanent threat to the 
electricity system, which in some cases responds with high price volatility due to the low demand 
elasticity. It is crucial to note that climatic conditions have such an impact because of electricity-
specific characteristics which, as emphasised above, make the traditional market clearing 
mechanisms (such as delivery delay and substitution of other goods) unavailable. 
 
4.1.3 Congestion  management 
Since interconnection capacities are constrained (see paragraph 4.3 infra), cross-border exchanges 
have to be managed in order both to maximise competition and to avoid system overload. This topic 
is considered in the European Regulation 1228/2003 ("on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity"), which states that network congestion problems must be 
addressed with non-discriminatory and market-based solutions. Currently, a wide range of 
congestion management methods are used across Europe
49. In continental Europe, the most used 
method is explicit auctioning, while market splitting/coupling, initially only used in Scandinavia, 
should expand considerably with the decision taken recently by the Belgian, Dutch and French 
power exchanges to link their markets to integrate their exchanges (APX, Powernext and Belpex) 
and to use this technique to allocate (part of) the cross-border capacity.  
 
                                                           
46  Faced with the crisis, the French government authorised power stations to discharge water at a higher temperature 
than normally permitted. As to the measures taken in France to manage the crisis, see for example Mattatia S. (2003). 
47  With, for example, temperatures 10°C below the average for the time of the year in France and Spain. 
48  Le Monde, the March 11, 2005. 
49   As can be seen for instance in ETSO (2004). NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    31 
   
Under explicit auctioning, the TSOs of the systems between which congestion exists sell their 
interconnector capacity to the highest bidder; explicit auctioning thus separates transactions in 
electricity from transactions in cross-border transmission capacity.  
 
Market splitting, also called implicit auctioning, integrates electricity and transmission markets. The 
existence of a power exchange on each side of the interconnector is a necessary condition. Market 
splitting is today generally regarded as the most efficient and transparent congestion management 
method
50. Box 4 focuses on how it operates in theory. Ultimately, explicit auctioning and market 
splitting generate incomes that are supposed to reflect the marginal value of the congested 
interconnector
51.  
 
Box 4: Congestion management : market splitting 
 
Graph 8 describes the market splitting mechanism in a simple theoretical case of two countries with 
limited interconnection capacity. At a first stage, each country's spot market clears as if there was no 
interconnection between them. The initial equilibria are (qA1,pA1) on market A and (qB1,pB1) on market B. 
Then the market operator of the market with the highest price, i.e. market A, buys electricity from the 
exchange with the lower price, i.e. market B. The amount of electricity imported is just as high as the 
congested line allows, and is equal to quantity x. On market A, electricity imports mean a supply 
increase, so that the supply curve shifts to the right. The movement is exactly the opposite on market B, 
where exports imply a demand increase and a shift to the right. This results in two new equilibria, i.e. 
(qA2,pA2) and (qB2,pB2), corresponding to a price decrease on market A and a price increase on market B. 
 
                                                           
50   It is also supported by the European Commission (2001b).   
51   For an overview of congestion management methods, see for instance Boisseleau F. and L. de Vries (2001) or 
Krause T. (2005). 32  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
GRAPH 8  MARKET SPLITTING MECHANISM  
Spot market A  Spot market B 
 
 
For each unit of electricity imported/exported, the market operators have thus received a margin equal to 
the price gap, i.e. pA2-pB2, so that their total profit is (pA2-pB2)*x. The unitary margin reflects the marginal 
value of the congested interconnector. It may also be noted that, on the whole, society has benefited, 
since the aggregate surplus for society (i.e. the sum of aggregate producer and consumer surplus) has 
increased in both markets.  
 
Summing up, if the interconnector is not congested, both zones have the same price. If the 
interconnector is congested, the prices in the two zones will be different. It follows from the reasoning 
above that the market splitting mechanism requires a power exchange at both ends of the 
interconnector.  
 
4.2  The physics of electricity transmission 
Since electricity generation and power consumption take seldom place at the same location (this is 
due to specific needs of generation equipment, like cooling water, to the difference in size of 
production and consumption units, ...) electrical power transport is required. Such transport makes 
use of high voltage lines because high voltages limit transport losses
52. But even in that case losses 
can be substantial
53. Without entering into technical details one can say that there are two 
alternatives for transporting power; (1) high-voltage direct current (HVDC) power transport and (2) 
                                                           
52   See also Coppens F., D. Vivet (2004).  
53   It can easily be computed that, typically, on a 380 kV line the power lost is around 0.5 p.c. per 100 km under normal 
circumstances (i.e. with a 50 p.c.load factor) Thus if 500 MW is transported over a 1000 MW line, every 100 km around 
2.5 MW is dissipated as heat. 
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high-voltage alternating current (HVAC) transport. HVDC transport shows lower losses and lower 
transport infrastructure costs (pylons and cables) than HVAC transport, however, since most user 
equipment and most generating equipment uses (resp generates) alternate current, an HVDC 
system requires (very expensive) conversion equipment. It follows that such HVDC transport is only 
advantageous when power has to be transported over very long distances without being tapped 
underway (i.e. for peer to peer transport). This is why most of the contemporary power transport 
uses HVAC lines. Only in exceptional cases (undersea power transport, power generated from 
hydro stations in the north of Sweden is transported to the south through HVDC lines) HVDC is 
used.  
 
For reasons of security of supply these HVAC transport networks are meshed giving rise to the 
problem of so-called loop flows. Physical laws (i.e. the laws of Kirchhoff) imply that electrical current 
follows the path of least resistance, so that power flowing through a meshed network follows a non-
deterministic route. This implies that when a consumer and a generator contract for the delivery of a 
certain amount of power at a certain time of delivery, the consumer can never be sure that the 
power he consumes comes from the generator he contracted with. This is in strong contrast to the 
transport of other commodities and has some complex side effects.  
 
Figure 2 shows the flows generated by power sales from a French producer to a Dutch consumer. 
In that case only 48 p.c. of the power sold transits through Belgium, the remainder is transmitted via 
Germany and even Switzerland. In a similar way, sales from a French producer to a German 
consumer cause substantial unidentified flows (also called loop flows) via Belgium
54.  
 
                                                           
54   34 p.c. transits through Belgium and the Netherlands, 35 p.c. crosses the French-German border immediately, 18 p.c. 
is transmitted via Switzerland and 13 p.c. flows through Italy (source RTE).  34  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
FIGURE 2  LOOP FLOWS GENERATED BY POWER SALES FROM A FRENCH 
PRODUCER TO A DUTCH CONSUMER.  
 
Source: Haubrich H.J., Fritz W. (1999). 
 
Thus, a transaction between a French generator and a Dutch consumer entails unidentified flows in 
the transmission network of several TSO's and in the interconnectors, potentially creating 
congestion on some of the transmission lines. TSOs must manage these flows. It is evident that this 
loop flow management requires a lot of coordination among TSOs. The associated costs are 
transport costs. These costs can however not be charged to the contracting parties.  
 
The loop flow problem interacts with other difficulties associated with electrical power. A relatively 
clear example is the volatility of wind power production. Wind power plants are 'must run' units - i.e. 
they should produce when there is wind - their production is unpredictable. The 'must run' property 
implies that all at a sudden the injection of wind power in the network can increase significantly, 
causing loop flows on neighbouring lines and networks. As such, supplies from a wind-based power 
plant in the north of Germany to a large consuming center in the south of the country induce loop 
flows through the Netherlands, Belgium and France.  
 
The undetermined transport path, combined with the phenomenon of transport losses entails other 
side effects and costs. Indeed, assuming that an Italian consumer concludes a contract with a 
Danish producer for the delivery of 100 MW of electrical power in a particular hour, then the Italian 
consumer will extract this 100 MW and the Danish generator will inject it during that specific hour. 
However, due to the meshed European grid and to the laws of Kirchoff, the Italian consumer will not 
receive Danish power but part of it will come from neighbouring generators. Some power will also 
be lost due to heat dissipation underway and these losses will have to be compensated by different 
European TSOs by injecting additional power (bought on the balancing market, see box 3). This 
loss compensation however entails costs for these TSOs. These costs can not be charged to any NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    35 
   
individual consumer of producer (because the consumer/producer can not be identified) so that 
these costs will have to be compensated out of a common fund (see box 5 for additional information 
on the ETSO cross-border trading mechanism)
55 
56.  
 
Box 5: The ETSO cross-border trading (CBT) mechanism 
 
When a generator and a consumer, located in different regions, contract for the delivery of electrical 
power, the physical characteristics of electricity transport imply that transport costs (the 
management of loop flows and the compensation of transport losses) can not be charged to the 
parties involved in the transaction. As a consequence, the intermediate TSOs incur costs which 
they should be compensated for. The financial compensation of these costs occurs through the 
cross-border trading (CBT) mechanism. The entities involved in this CBT mechanism are the 
participating TSOs. Some TSOs (i.e. the TSOs where the generator and the consumer are located) 
will have to contribute to a common fund, others (the TSOs that have to compensate losses and to 
manage loop flows) will have be compensated for the incurred costs.  
 
In order to finance the CBT costs, every TSO that participates in the CBT-mechanism contributes to 
a compensation fund in proportion to the size of its net imports or exports. Thus TSOs having high 
net imports (or exports) contribute more to the fund than smaller (net) importers (exporters)
(*).  
 
The amount due to each TSO (for managing loop flows and for loss compensation) consists of two 
components - a transit component (including loop flows) and a loss component. The transit 
component equals the fraction of transits on its network multiplied by the long-run average costs 
(LRAC) of its network (i.e.  LRAC
load   total transits
transits
×
+
), the first factor is called the 'transit key'. 
The loss component equals the total losses on the transits times the average energy price.  
 
According to the reasoning above, all participating net importers or exporters contribute to the CBT 
compensation fund. However no contributions are paid for imports coming from non-participating 
TSOs (note that exports to non-participating TSOs are included)  
For each import into a participating country, coming from a non-participating country (called a 
perimeter country), a fee of 1  €/MWh is charged to the perimeter country. These fees also 
contribute to the financing of the CBT mechanism.  
 
(*)
  These contributions can be included in the access tariffs charged by the TSO to its local users (i.e. generators and 
consumers). 
                                                           
55   For an example of the difficulties encountered in such common compensation mechanisms, see for instance. Daxhelet 
O., Y. Smeers (2005).  
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The fact that each intermediate TSO compensates part of the losses implies that power is never 
transported over very long distances and losses are relatively limited. However these losses are 
only limited when there are neighbouring generators in order to limit the transport distance to be 
covered. The condition, thus, is that power generation is dispersed across Europe. This means that, 
unlike for other commodities (e.g. steel), a situation in which all power is generated in a certain 
region (due to competitive advantages) and then transported over long distances to a consuming 
region, is inconceivable.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that power transport infrastructure is capital-intensive and is 
characterised by high construction lead times. The environmental and aesthetic problems 
associated with power transport give rise to NIMBY attitudes further increasing lead times. It is clear 
that this problem is even worse for interconnections between member states.  
 
4.3 Interconnection  infrastructures 
For several years, numerous documents from the European Commission have been underlining the 
insufficiency of interconnection capacities between Member States, which is crippling the creation of 
an integrated European electricity market
57. In particular, more interconnection capacity would do 
much to correct the problems associated with the national market structures, which are too often 
concentrated (see 3.1.1), by allowing competing imports from abroad. Increasing interconnection 
capacities is also a way to improve security of supply. 
 
Due to the limited interconnections, Europe is far from being a totally integrated market. In fact, the 
European electricity system should rather be seen as consisting of a core area (Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, Benelux, Austria and Switzerland) and satellites with limited interconnection 
capacity, such as Ireland, the United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries and the Iberian peninsula. 
Even though interconnections between these blocs can be improved, long-distance exchanges may 
not be seen as an objective in themselves, due to network losses (see 4.2). That is why UCTE, the 
Union for the Co-ordination of the Transmission of Electricity, taking a long-term view, claims that a 
competitive European market is a market where supply is competitive on a local level
58.  
 
Table 5 presents the level of interconnection capacity for a number of countries, by "electric region". 
The main conclusion to be drawn is that the biggest producing countries have (very) few 
interconnections with the others. Moreover, a lack of interconnections can be observed both 
between the regions and within them. For example, because of substantial exports from France to 
the Netherlands and Germany, the interconnector on Belgium’s southern border is congested most 
                                                           
57  See for example Commission of the European Communities (2003a). 
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of the time, despite Belgium’s apparently satisfactory level of interconnections. Moreover, import 
capacities in table 5 do not take into account the existence of long-term contracts concluded before 
the liberalisation process started. In some cases, these contracts monopolise a significant 
proportion of the interconnections, which as a consequence are unavailable for competition. 
Conversely, the Scandinavian markets are generally considered to be well integrated with each 
other
59.  
 
TABLE 5  INTERCONNECTION CAPACITIES 
  Import capacity as a 
percentage of 
installed capacity 
(pct.) 
Belgium 29 
France  13 
Germany  11 
Luxembourg  90 
The Netherlands  17 
Austria  24 
Italy  8 
   
Portugal  8 
Spain  4 
   
United Kingdom  3 
Ireland  6 
   
Norway  18 
Sweden  29 
Denmark  50 
Finland  14 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2005). 
 
The European Commission has taken a number of initiatives in order to improve this problematic 
situation. In particular, several critical bottlenecks have been identified, where investments are a 
priority and are supported financially. In this respect, reference can be made to the interconnections 
between France, Germany and Benelux, between France and Spain, between Denmark and 
Germany, between Italy and all its neighbouring countries, and between the United Kingdom and 
continental Europe. The interconnector capacities have already improved, but it will take quite a 
long time to realise the necessary investments. Another notable initiative was launched at the 
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European Council of Barcelona, which set the target for Member States to have a level of electricity 
interconnection equivalent to at least 10 p.c. of installed production capacity by 2005. Even though 
it is difficult to determine the optimum level needed precisely, it is clear that this target will not 
suffice, in particular for countries where the market is still highly concentrated. 
 
As regards the interconnections issue, the European Commission has recently emphasised the 
importance of developing regional markets as a necessary intermediate stage on the road to a 
European market
60. These regional markets would be composed of Member States with a 
reasonably good level of interconnection; in the Commission’s view, these markets include the 
Iberian market (Portugal and Spain), the West European market (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands), the Italian market and the Nordic market (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden). The Commission expects these markets to develop a more 
harmonised regulatory approach, in particular as to the degree of market opening, the setting of 
transmission tariffs or congestion management. The Commission leaves the initiative to the 
Member States and expects the regional markets to develop "organically" through cooperation 
between institutions in neighbouring countries
61.  
 
                                                           
60  See European Commission (2004b), and ERGEG press release PR-06-05 of 27 February 2006. 
61  However, it may be held that a European legal framework for regional markets should be developed with a set of 
minimum requirements. This would certainly speed up the creation of the regional markets and facilitate their 
integration into a single European market. On the regional markets issue, see for instance de Jong J. (2004). NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    39 
   
 
5 REGULATION 
The term "regulation" covers a wide range of areas, such as the tasks assigned to the sectoral 
regulatory authorities, the legislative package, the market design or the overall regulatory context in 
which liberalisation takes place.  
 
As far as regulatory authorities are concerned, the duties assigned to them by Directive 2003/54/EC 
are essentially of a technical nature. Their key task is the approval of network access tariffs and 
conditions. Methodologies for tariff setting are to be approved in advance, but changes can be 
required on an ex post basis. The regulator must also monitor and in the event of problems 
concerning, among other things, the management of interconnection capacities, the management of 
congested national systems, the unbundling of accounts or the connection of new producers and 
act if necessary. Regarding any of these issues, the regulator has to settle complaints against the 
transmission or distribution system operator. 
 
Essentially on the initiative of the European Commission, national regulators meet in several 
organisations, such as the Electricity Regulatory Forum of Florence, (better known as the Florence 
Forum), the CEER (Council of European Energy Regulators) or the ERGEG (European Regulators 
Group for Electricity and Gas)
62. They share the same objective, i.e. the building of a European 
energy market. Although praiseworthy in terms of their cooperation and their role in offering advice 
and exchanging expertise, these meetings are only of a consultative nature, so that their 
effectiveness strictly depends on the Member States' degree of consensus.  
 
As far as the overall regulatory context is concerned, there are two main issues, namely regulatory 
uncertainty and inadequate harmonisation. In the case of electricity, the uncertainty concerns 
various aspects and may roughly be divided into two elements. The first source of uncertainty is the 
liberalisation process itself, which, through its various adjustments and related controversies, 
certainly does not inspire confidence among enterprises. The process has been largely evolutionary 
and most stakeholders expect it to go on evolving. The second source of uncertainty is constituted 
by issues surrounding the sector, such as the debates over nuclear energy, the enforcement of the 
Kyoto protocol and its effects, which are difficult to predict, as well as the possible interference of 
                                                           
62  Created by the Commission in 1998, the Florence Forum convenes twice a year and brings together the Commission, 
national electricity regulators and responsible ministries, TSOs, industry and consumers. The goal of the Forum is to 
discuss issues that are not addressed in the Electricity Directive relating to the creation of a real internal electricity 
market. The main issues addressed by the Forum concern the tarification of cross-border electricity exchanges and the 
allocation and management of scarce interconnection capacity.  
  The CEER was created in 2000 as an association of national regulators, and has two objectives, namely mutual 
cooperation among regulators and cooperation with the European institutions. The ERGEG was established by the 
European Commission in 2003 and aims at facilitating consultation, coordination and cooperation among national 
regulators, as well as fostering the consistent application of European Directives and any future legislation. CEER and 
ERGEG share similar objectives and they are closely linked.   40  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
political interests
63. As highlighted above, these factors may have harmful consequences such as 
hindering or diverting essential investments. 
 
As regards harmonisation problems, it should be recalled that the EU decision-making process is 
consensus-oriented and that this tends to lead to insufficient outcomes for those policy areas where 
a broad consensus is missing
64. This is indeed the very case for electricity deregulation, which has 
been particularly subject to controversy between Member States, as reflected by the long period of 
bargaining before an agreement was reached on the first Directive. In accordance with the 
subsidiarity principle, this first Directive left many options open for national implementation and was 
subject to sometimes acid criticism such as that by Hancher (1997): "The margin of choice [given by 
the Directive] is so substantial that it would seem possible for determined anti-market countries to 
avoid introducing any meaningful degree of competition at all." Nearly ten years after the beginning 
of the deregulation process, in view of the divergences in market concentration, market 
interconnections and the degree of unbundling between countries, such a judgement deserves 
credibility. Yet, the second Directive as well as Regulation 1228/2003 have reduced national 
margins of choice to some extent, notably in the fields of network access and cross-border 
exchange management. In particular, Regulation 1228/2003 authorises the European Commission 
to establish guidelines on cross-border trade, under what is called the "comitology procedure"
65. 
However, on aspects such as security of supply or public service obligations, although the 
objectives are set, the tools to be used are largely left to the Member States' discretion. Another 
factor of distortion is the absence of any uniform decision on the nuclear question, which 
automatically favours the generators based in countries where the technology is allowed. 
 
More generally, electricity market design, particularly the ways in which competition is introduced 
and market power problems are handled, is still greatly affected by the lack of harmonisation. On 
the resolution of currently unsolvable market power problems, it might be interesting to refer to a 
passage from the Belgian regulator’s annual report, in response to a study calling for the divestment 
of Electrabel, the dominant Belgian generator: "Ultimately, the policy adopted by the European 
Union should ensure the emergence of a European electricity market instead of the various national 
markets. The players on the European market could be limited in size and extremely numerous. (...) 
Equally, however, the market could consist of a few very large groups (...). The form which the 
                                                           
63  These political interests may be very diversified, with for instance the desire to guarantee self-sufficiency in energy, to 
cap prices if they become too volatile or to defend a national supplier. As to this last point, an example which may be 
referred to is law 301 passed by the Italian Government in 2001, better known as the "anti-EDF law", after EDF had 
bought about 20 pct. of the Italian company Montedison. The law imposed a 2 pct. cap on a shareholder's voting rights 
in an Italian electricity or gas company, if this shareholder was a public company in a dominant position on its national 
market and not quoted on a stock exchange.  
64   See Egenhofer C. and K. Gialoglou (2004). 
65   For a description, see for instance de Jong H. and R. Hakvoort (2005). Under the comitology procedure, the 
Commission chairs a regulatory committee composed of the representatives of the Member States and, in the case of 
electricity regulation, also of the ERGEG, acting as an advisory committee. These committees enable the Commission 
to set up a dialogue with national administrations before adopting certain measures. For a guideline to be adopted, it 
must be approved by a qualified majority within the regulatory committee.  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    41 
   
market of tomorrow will take will basically depend on the policy implemented by the states in which 
the main electricity companies are currently established. However, none of these states has so far 
taken effective steps designed to create perfect competition at European level. Belgium does not 
fall into this category of states, and so does not take part in this decision-making process. This is 
also why the abolition of a dominant position on the Belgian electricity market would not have any 
effect. On the other hand, Belgium can make its weight felt as it has a medium-sized enterprise at 
European level. It is precisely the existence of this type of enterprise that will make it possible to 
prevent the big groups from abusing their dominant position on the market without restraint, to the 
detriment of consumers."
66 This passage most aptly illustrates and highlights how the lack of market 
design uniformity inhibits the tackling of market concentration at national level. 
 
                                                           
66  Foreword by the chairman in the Commission for Electricity and Gas Regulation (2004).  42  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
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6 CONCLUSION 
Electricity liberalisation in Europe is part of the wider trend towards the deregulation of network 
industries around the world. Whereas empirical evidence generally suggests that deregulation has 
had a positive impact on efficiency and consumer welfare in telecommunications and air travel for 
example
67, the results expected for the electricity sector are much more ambiguous so far. Anyway, 
as only a few countries have fully completed their deregulation process, the available evidence is 
not yet sufficient to build a comprehensive judgement. Moreover, as far as the European Union is 
more particularly concerned, factors external to the deregulation process in the strict sense cause 
interference. For instance, increasing oil, gas and coal prices as well as the enforcement of the 
Kyoto protocol are responsible for much of the increase in bulk electricity prices, but, as that impact 
cannot be quantified, it is also impossible to determine how prices would have moved otherwise, i.e. 
the real impact of deregulation. Nevertheless, as was done throughout this paper, one can point out 
a number of issues raised by electricity deregulation, which could influence the final outcome.  
 
The foremost problems are related to the unusual characteristics of "electricity" as a product, which 
make the industry very different from other network industries: electricity is not storable, demand 
and supply must be constantly balanced, and demand is both volatile and inelastic. As a 
consequence, the traditional market clearing mechanisms, such as delivery delay or substitution of 
other goods, are not available for electricity. This implies price volatility on power exchanges and 
makes the security of the system more vulnerable to climatic conditions. It also creates the need for 
a heterogeneous production park with sufficient reserve generation capacity. This virtually divides 
the generation market into base-load, mid-peak and peak-load segments. This in turn might give 
rise to economies of scale in some subsegments and the existence of inframarginal rents and as 
such create entry barriers hindering competition.  
 
Although there is an economic rationale for the choice for heterogeneous generation technologies, 
today's heterogeneity in generation mix across European countries has been dictated by past 
national choices based on a combination of economic, geographical, geopolitical and/or political 
considerations. Nevertheless this mix has important consequences in deregulated markets: 
generators based in countries where the least costly techniques (i.e. nuclear and hydro power) are 
available enjoy an ex nihilo competitive advantage. This advantage is further strengthened when 
greenhouse gas emissions are internalised.  
 
In order to avoid a system breakdown, efficient coordination and the exchange of information are 
required between the various segments of the sector — i.e. generation, transmission, distribution 
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and supply. The unbundling of these segments, which is one of the central measures in the 
deregulation process, has complicated the achievement of this crucial requirement and entails a 
new type of costs - transaction costs - that might reduce the potential gains from the introduction of 
competition in generation and supply. 
 
As far as interconnection capacities between national markets are concerned, they are widely 
considered as insufficient. This situation is crippling the creation of a single European market. More 
interconnection capacities would in many cases solve the problem of concentration on national 
markets. The European Commission has taken initiatives to improve this situation, such as financial 
support for investments where critical bottlenecks exist. Since it will take a long time for these 
investments to realise, the Commission has recently emphasised the benefits of developing 
regional markets as an interim stage on the road to a European market. In practice, with the 
exception of Nord Pool, national markets are still far from being integrated. Regional integration 
initiatives are, however, emerging, such as the recent decision to couple the Belgian, French and 
Dutch markets.  
 
As far as international power trade is concerned, it should be mentioned that power transport over 
long distances requires high infrastructure investments and is characterised by high operational 
costs (compensation of losses, congestion management, loop flow management etc.). As a 
consequence - costs being the sum of generation and transport costs - power generation will 
probably always be dispersed across Europe 
 
The electricity industry is also at the crossroads of two important concerns, i.e. the enforcement of 
the Kyoto protocol and the security of the energy supply. Whereas pollution and security problems 
were previously considered as market failures and, as such, were managed by governments 
through industry regulation and planning, the present European policymakers tend to prioritise the 
market as the way to solve them. However, this market approach is not free from criticism. For 
instance, the unequal national reduction targets and the use of different technologies, combined 
with the existence of entry barriers, might distort competition. As far as security of supply is 
concerned, there are a number of reasons why the market by itself might not be able to achieve a 
satisfactory level of reserve capacity as well as an appropriate diversity in the mix of fuels used by 
the electricity-generating facilities. 
 
In order to minimise the impact of these difficulties on the deregulation outcome, a consistent 
regulatory framework is essential. However, the current framework seems far from satisfactory.  
 
Firstly, the current regulatory framework creates uncertainty. The first source of uncertainty is the 
liberalisation process itself, which, through its various adjustments and related controversies, NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    45 
   
certainly does not inspire confidence among market players. The process has been largely 
evolutionary and most stakeholders expect it to go on evolving. The second source of uncertainty 
concerns issues surrounding the sector, such as the debates over nuclear energy, the enforcement 
of the Kyoto protocol and its effects on prices which are hard to predict. These factors of uncertainty 
may have harmful consequences such as hindering or diverting essential investments.  
 
Secondly, the regulatory framework suffers from a lack of harmonisation. This is mainly due to the 
EU decision-making process, which is in general consensus-oriented, and which therefore tends to 
lead to minimalist outcomes for those policy areas where a broad consensus is missing. Now this is 
precisely the case for electricity deregulation, which has been and still is particularly subject to 
controversy between Member States. This situation has resulted in extensive freedom in terms of 
national implementation. The lack of harmonisation is particularly prejudicial to the economic design 
of the market, notably the degree of competition introduced, the handling of market power 
problems, the decisions concerning interconnections, the degree of unbundling or the ways of 
ensuring adequate investment. A last point is the absence of a unified decision on the nuclear 
question, which would eliminate a source of competition distortions.  46  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
 
Bibliography 
 
Bergman L. (2003), "European electricity market integration: the Nordic experiences", Research 
symposium European electricity markets, The Hague. 
 
Bergougnoux J. (2000), "Services publics en réseau: perspectives de concurrence et nouvelles 
régulations", Rapport au Commissariat Général du Plan, La Documentation Française, Paris. 
 
Boisseleau F. and R. Hakvoort (2003), "The liberalization process of the European electricity 
market(s): an unstructured restructuring process ?", 26th international IAEE conference 
proceedings, June 4-7-2003, Prague. 
 
Boisseleau F. and L. de Vries (2001), "Congestion management and power exchanges: their 
significance for a liberalised electricity market and their mutual dependence", Gas and electricity 
forum, Scuola Enrico Mattei - ENI, June, Milan.   
 
Bonnet J.-P. (2000), "La régulation du système électrique européen: le processus de Florence", 
Energies et matières premières, no12.  
 
Boussena S., J.-P.Pauwels, C.Locatelli, C. Swartenbroekx (2006), "Le défi pétrolier", Vuibert, mars 
2006.   
 
BP (2005), "BP Statistical Review of World Energy", June 2005.  
 
Brunekreeft G. and T. McDaniel (2005a), "Policy uncertainty and supply adequacy in electric power 
markets", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21 (1). 
 
Brunekreeft G. and S.Twelemann (2005b), "Regulation, competition and investment in the German 
electricity market: RegTP or REGTP", The Energy Journal, 26 special issue.  
 
Capgemini (2004), "European energy markets deregulation observatory sixth edition - Winter 
2003/2004".   
 
Chauvet N. (2000), "Convergence gaz-électricité", Revue de l'énergie, no 521.  
 
Coase R. (1960), "The problem of social cost", Journal of Law and Economics, 3.  
 
Codognet and al. (2003), "Mergers and acquisitions in the European electricity sector - cases and 
patterns", Cerna, Ecole nationale supérieure des mines de Paris, Paris.  
 
Commission for Electricity and Gas Regulation (2004), "Annual report 2003 — Summary", Brussels. 
 
Commission for Electricity and Gas Regulation (2006), "De geplande concentratie tussen Gaz de 
France en Suez", CREG studie (F)060306-CDC-534, March 2006. 
 
Commission of the European Communities (1999), "Dilemma study: study of the contribution of 
nuclear power to the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation", Brussels.  
 
Commission of the European Communities (2003a), " Energy infrastructure and security of supply", 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2003) 
743 final, Brussels. 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2003b), "Implementing the internal energy market - 
second benchmarking report", Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Luxembourg.  
 
Commission of the European Communities (2004), "Electricity from renewable energy sources", 
Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Luxembourg. NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    47 
   
 
Commission of the European Communities (2005a), "Green paper on energy efficiency or doing 
more with less", COM(2005) 265 final, Brussels.  
 
Commission of the European Communities (2005b), "Annual report on the implementation of the 
gas and electricity internal market", COM(2004) 863, Brussels. 
 
Coppens F. and D.Vivet (2004), "The liberalization of network industries: is electricity an exception 
to the rule ?", National Bank of Belgium, working paper no 59. 
 
Coppens F. (2005), "Divestiture or virtual power plants: the solution to the problem of the dominant 
producer ? - The case of Belgium", paper presented at the 7th IAEE European Energy 
Conference, August 2005, Bergen. 
 
Daxhelet O, Smeers Y. (2005), "Inter-TSO Compensation mechanism", Harvard Electricity Policy 
Group, November 7, 2005. 
 
de Jong H. and R. Hakvoort (2005), "The dynamic regulatory process towards a single European 
electricity market, Proceeding of Energy and power systems, April 2005, Krabi, Thailand.  
 
de Jong J. (2004), "The regional approach in establishing the internal EU electricity market", 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague. 
 
de Vries L. and R. Hakvoort (2004), "The question of generation adequacy in liberalized electricity 
markets", FEEM, working paper no 120.04. 
 
de Vries L. (2004), "Securing the public interest in electricity generation markets — The myths of 
the invisible hand and the copper plate", Ph.D. dissertation, Delft University of technology, Faculty 
of technology, policy and management.  
 
DGEMP-DIDEME (2004), "Coûts de référence de la production électrique — Deuxième partie: 
moyens de production décentralisés", Ministère de l'économie, Paris.  
 
Doorman G. (2001), "Capacity subscriptions - securing the balance between peak supply and 
demand", Proceedings of the market design 2001 conference, 7 and 8 June, Stockholm.  
 
Egenhofer C. and K. Gialoglou (2005), "Rethinking the EU regulatory strategy for the internal 
energy market', Center for European policy studies, task force report no 52. 
 
Energy SA (2001), "Demand side management — Benefits to industry and the community", 
Government of South Australia.  
 
Esnault B. (2002), "Nouvelles formes de marchés électriques et choix d'investissement", Cahiers de 
recherche du CGEMP, no 1/2002. 
 
ETSO (2004), "An overview of current cross-border congestion management methods in Europe".  
 
European Commission (1998), "Opening up to choice - the single electricity market", Brussels. 
 
European Commission (2001a), "Green paper - Towards a European strategy for the security of 
energy supply", Luxembourg. 
 
European Commission (2001b), "Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity", 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels.  
 
European Commission (2004), "European Union Energy & Transport in figures, 2004 edition, Part 2: 
Energy", 2004. 
 48  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
European Commission (2004a), "Measures to secure electricity supply", Note of DG Energy and 
Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in electricity and 
natural gas, non-binding document, Brussels. 
 
European Commission (2004b), "Medium-term vision for the internal electricity market", DG Energy 
and Transport working paper, strategy paper, Brussels. 
 
European Electricity Regulatory Forum (2003), "Conclusions from the tenth meeting", July 2003, 
Rome.   
 
Geman H. (2002), "Towards a European Market for Electricity: Spot and Derivatives Trading", 
Université Paris IX Dauphine and ESSEC, May 2002. 
 
Glachant J.-M. (2002), "The making of competitive electricity markets in Europe: no single way and 
no "single market", in Glachant J.-M. & D. Finon (eds), Competition in European Electricity 
Markets: A Cross Country Comparison, Edward Elgar. 
 
Gönenç R., M. Maher and G. Nicoletti (2001), "The implementation and the effects of regulatory 
reform: past experience and current issues", OECD Economic studies no 32. 
 
Graus W., M. Voogt and J.-W. Langeraar (2004), "Ranking power - scorecards electricity 
companies", WWF Powerswitch Campaign.  
 
Hancher L. (1997), "Slow and not so sure: Europe's long march to electricity liberalisation", The 
Electricity Journal, 10 (9), November. 
 
Hansen J.-P. (2004), "La création d'un Grand Marché Électrique européen: ce qui est nécessaire et 
ce qui reste insuffisant", allocution prononcée le 23 novembre 2004 à la Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven. 
 
Haubrich H.J., W. Fritz (1999), "Cross border electricity transmission tariffs", study ordered by the 
European Commission, April 1999, Aachen. 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency (2004), "Nuclear Technology Review", IAEA, Vienna. 
 
International Energy Agency (2001), "Things that go blip in the night — Standby power and how to 
limit it", OECD/IEA, Paris.  
 
International Energy Agency (2002), "Security of supply in electricity markets — Evidence and 
policy issues", OECD/IEA, Paris.  
 
International Energy Agency (2003a), "The power to choose — Demand response in liberalised 
electricity markets", OECD/IEA, Paris. 
 
International Energy Agency (2003b), "Power generation investment in electricity markets", 
OECD/IEA, Paris.   
 
International Energy Agency (2004a), "CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 1971-2002", 
OECD/IEA, Paris.  
 
International Energy Agency (2004b), "World Energy Outlook 2004", OECD/IEA, Paris.  
 
International Energy Agency (2005), "Saving electricity in a hurry", OECD/IEA, Paris. 
 
Jamasb T. and M. Pollitt (2005), "Electricity market reform in the European Union: review of 
progress towards liberalisation and integration", Cambridge working papers in economics, no 66, 
University of Cambridge.  
 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    49 
   
Joskow P. (2002), "Electricity sector restructuring and competition: a transactions cost perspective", 
in Brousseau E. and J.-M. Glachant (eds), The economics of contracts, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Kaserman D. and J. Mayo (1991), "The measurement of vertical economies and the efficient 
structure of the electric utility industry", The journal of industrial economics, 39 (5). 
 
Krause T. (2005), "Congestion management in liberalized electricity markets — Theoretical 
concepts and international application", Power systems laboratory, Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology, Zürich.  
 
Knops H. (2003), "Securing electricity supply: what is the potential of national measures in the 
European market?", Research symposium European electricity markets, The Hague.  
 
Lee B.-J. (1995), "Separability test for the electric supply industry", Journal of applied econometrics 
10 (1).  
 
Maloney M. (2001), "Economies and diseconomies: estimating electricity cost functions", Review of 
industrial organization, 19 (1). 
 
Mattatia S. (2003), "Notre système électrique à l'épreuve de la canicule", Énergies et matières 
premières, no 23. 
 
Meier A. (2004), "Saving electricity quickly", paper, International Energy Agency. 
 
Meade R. (2005), "Electricity investment and security of supply in liberalized electricity systems", in 
Mielczarski W., Development of electricity markets, Series The European power supply industry, 
New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc., Wellington.  
 
Office fédéral de l'énergie (2003), "Énergie nucléaire et politique énergétique à l'étranger", Fiches 
d'information sur les initiatives atomiques, Berne. 
 
Office for Energy Regulation (2003), "Market mechanisms for guaranteeing generation adequacy", 
DTe's contribution to the CEER working group "security of supply", The Hague. 
 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003a), "Climate change and the power industry". 
 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003b), "Movers and shapers 2003, Utilities - Europe". 
 
The Boston Consulting Group (2003), "Keeping the lights on: navigating choices in European power 
generation", Boston.  
 
The Brattle Group (2001), "The California crisis and its lessons for the EU", London.  
 
Tönjes C. (2003), "Security of electricity supply reaches beyond new power plants", CIEP Current 
Affairs, Clingendael Institute, The Hague.  
 
Turvey R. (2003), "Ensuring adequate generation capacity", Utilities Policy, 11 (2). 
 
UCTE (2003), "EC Strategy paper: medium-term vision for the internal electricity market - 
comments by UCTE", 10th meeting of the Florence Forum.  
 
UCTE (2005), "UCTE system adequacy forecast 2005-2015", UCTE, Brussels.  
 
Wilson R. (2002), "Architecture of power markets", Econometrica, Vol. 70, n°4. 
 
 50  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
 
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM - WORKING PAPERS SERIES 
 
1.  "Model-based inflation forecasts and monetary policy rules" by M. Dombrecht and R. Wouters, 
Research Series, February 2000. 
2.  "The use of robust estimators as measures of core inflation" by L. Aucremanne, Research 
Series, February 2000. 
3.  "Performances économiques des Etats-Unis dans les années nonante" by A.  Nyssens, 
P. Butzen, P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2000. 
4.  "A model with explicit expectations for Belgium" by P. Jeanfils, Research Series, March 2000. 
5.  "Growth in an open economy: some recent developments" by S. Turnovsky, Research Series, 
May 2000. 
6.  "Knowledge, technology and economic growth: an OECD perspective" by I.  Visco, 
A. Bassanini, S. Scarpetta, Research Series, May 2000. 
7.  "Fiscal policy and growth in the context of European integration" by P. Masson, Research 
Series, May 2000. 
8.  "Economic growth and the labour market: Europe's challenge" by C. Wyplosz, Research 
Series, May 2000. 
9.  "The role of the exchange rate in economic growth: a euro-zone perspective" by 
R. MacDonald, Research Series, May 2000. 
10.  "Monetary union and economic growth" by J. Vickers, Research Series, May 2000. 
11.  "Politique monétaire et prix des actifs: le cas des Etats-Unis" by Q. Wibaut, Document Series, 
August 2000. 
12.  "The Belgian industrial confidence indicator: leading indicator of economic activity in the euro 
area?" by J.J. Vanhaelen, L. Dresse, J. De Mulder, Document Series, November 2000. 
13. "Le financement des entreprises par capital-risque" by C. Rigo, Document Series, 
February 2001. 
14.  "La nouvelle économie" by P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2001. 
15. "De kostprijs van bankkredieten" by A.  Bruggeman and R.  Wouters, Document Series, 
April 2001. 
16. "A guided tour of the world of rational expectations models and optimal policies" by 
Ph. Jeanfils, Research Series, May 2001. 
17.  "Attractive Prices and Euro - Rounding effects on inflation" by L. Aucremanne and D. Cornille, 
Documents Series, November 2001. 
18.  "The interest rate and credit channels in Belgium: an investigation with micro-level firm data" by 
P. Butzen, C. Fuss and Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, December 2001. 
19  "Openness, imperfect exchange rate pass-through and monetary policy" by F.  Smets and 
R. Wouters, Research series, March 2002. 
20. "Inflation, relative prices and nominal rigidities" by L.  Aucremanne, G.  Brys, M.  Hubert, 
P. J. Rousseeuw and A. Struyf, Research series, April 2002. 
21.  "Lifting the burden: fundamental tax reform and economic growth" by D. Jorgenson, Research 
series, May 2002. 
22.  "What do we know about investment under uncertainty?" by L. Trigeorgis, Research series, 
May 2002. 
23. "Investment, uncertainty and irreversibility: evidence from Belgian accounting data" by 
D. Cassimon, P.-J. Engelen, H. Meersman, M. Van Wouwe, Research series, May 2002. NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    51 
   
24. "The impact of uncertainty on investment plans" by P.  Butzen, C.  Fuss, Ph.  Vermeulen, 
Research series, May 2002. 
25. "Investment, protection, ownership, and the cost of capital" by Ch.  P.  Himmelberg, 
R. G. Hubbard, I. Love, Research series, May 2002. 
26.  "Finance, uncertainty and investment: assessing the gains and losses of a generalised non-
linear structural approach using Belgian panel data", by M. Gérard, F. Verschueren, Research 
series, May 2002. 
27.  "Capital structure, firm liquidity and growth" by R. Anderson, Research series, May 2002. 
28. "Structural modelling of investment and financial constraints: where do we stand?" by 
J.- B. Chatelain, Research series, May 2002. 
29. "Financing and investment interdependencies in unquoted Belgian companies: the role of 
venture capital" by S. Manigart, K. Baeyens, I. Verschueren, Research series, May 2002. 
30. "Development path and capital structure of Belgian biotechnology firms" by V.  Bastin, 
A. Corhay, G. Hübner, P.-A. Michel, Research series, May 2002. 
31.  "Governance as a source of managerial discipline" by J. Franks, Research series, May 2002. 
32. "Financing constraints, fixed capital and R&D investment decisions of Belgian firms" by 
M. Cincera, Research series, May 2002. 
33.  "Investment, R&D and liquidity constraints: a corporate governance approach to the Belgian 
evidence" by P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2002. 
34. "On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies" by I.  Maes, Research series, 
July 2002. 
35.  "An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Euro Area", by F. Smets 
and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2002. 
36. "The labour market and fiscal impact of labour tax reductions: The case of reduction of 
employers' social security contributions under a wage norm regime with automatic price 
indexing of wages", by K. Burggraeve and Ph. Du Caju, Research series, March 2003. 
37. "Scope of asymmetries in the Euro Area", by S.  Ide and Ph.  Moës, Document series, 
March 2003. 
38.  "De autonijverheid in België: Het belang van het toeleveringsnetwerk rond de assemblage van 
personenauto's", by F. Coppens and G. van Gastel, Document series, June 2003. 
39.  "La consommation privée en Belgique", by B. Eugène, Ph. Jeanfils and B. Robert, Document 
series, June 2003. 
40. "The process of European monetary integration: a comparison of the Belgian and Italian 
approaches", by I. Maes and L. Quaglia, Research series, August 2003. 
41. "Stock market valuation in the United States", by P.  Bisciari, A.  Durré and A.  Nyssens, 
Document series, November 2003. 
42.  "Modeling the Term Structure of Interest Rates: Where Do We Stand?", by K. Maes, Research 
series, February 2004. 
43.  "Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of Systemic Risk in the Belgian Banking 
System", by H. Degryse and G. Nguyen, Research series, March 2004.  
44.  "How Frequently do Prices change? Evidence Based on the Micro Data Underlying the Belgian 
CPI", by L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, Research series, April 2004. 
45.  "Firm's investment decisions in reponse to demand and price uncertainty", by C. Fuss and 
Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, April 2004. 
46.  "SMEs and Bank Lending Relationships: the Impact of Mergers", by H.  Degryse, 
N. Masschelein and J. Mitchell, Research series, May 2004. 52  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006 
   
47.  "The Determinants of Pass-Through of Market Conditions to Bank Retail Interest Rates in 
Belgium", by F. De Graeve, O. De Jonghe and R. Vander Vennet, Research series, May 2004. 
48.  "Sectoral vs. country diversification benefits and downside risk", by M. Emiris, Research series, 
May 2004. 
49.  "How does liquidity react to stress periods in a limit order market?", by H. Beltran, A. Durré and 
P. Giot, Research series, May 2004. 
50. "Financial consolidation and liquidity: prudential regulation and/or competition policy?", by 
P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2004. 
51.  "Basel II and Operational Risk: Implications for risk measurement and management in the 
financial sector", by A.  Chapelle, Y.  Crama, G.  Hübner and J.-P.  Peters, Research series, 
May 2004. 
52.  "The Efficiency and Stability of Banks and Markets", by F. Allen, Research series, May 2004. 
53.  "Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?" by G.  Bekaert, C.R.  Harvey and C.  Lundblad, 
Research series, May 2004. 
54.  "Regulating Financial Conglomerates", by X. Freixas, G. Lóránth, A.D. Morrison and H.S. Shin, 
Research series, May 2004. 
55.  "Liquidity and Financial Market Stability", by M. O'Hara, Research series, May 2004. 
56.  "Economisch belang van de Vlaamse zeehavens: verslag 2002", by F. Lagneaux, Document 
series, June 2004. 
57.  "Determinants of Euro Term Structure of Credit Spreads", by A. Van Landschoot, Research 
series, July 2004. 
58.  "Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy-Making at the European Commission, from the Rome 
Treaties to the Hague Summit", by I. Maes, Research series, July 2004. 
59.  "Liberalisation of Network Industries: Is Electricity an Exception to the Rule?", by F. Coppens 
and D. Vivet, Document series, September 2004. 
60.  "Forecasting with a Bayesian DSGE model: an application to the euro area", by F. Smets and 
R. Wouters, Research series, September 2004. 
61.  "Comparing shocks and frictions in US and Euro Area Business Cycle: a Bayesian DSGE 
approach", by F. Smets and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2004. 
62.  "Voting on Pensions: A Survey", by G. de Walque, Research series, October 2004. 
63. "Asymmetric Growth and Inflation Developments in the Acceding Countries: A New 
Assessment", by S. Ide and P. Moës, Research series, October 2004. 
64. "Importance économique du Port Autonome de Liège: rapport 2002", by F.  Lagneaux, 
Document series, November 2004. 
65. "Price-setting behaviour in Belgium: what can be learned from an ad hoc survey", by 
L. Aucremanne and M. Druant, Research series, March 2005. 
66.  "Time-dependent versus State-dependent Pricing: A Panel Data Approach to the Determinants 
of Belgian Consumer Price Changes", by L.  Aucremanne and E.  Dhyne, Research series, 
April 2005. 
67.  "Indirect effects – A formal definition and degrees of dependency as an alternative to technical 
coefficients", by F. Coppens, Research series, May 2005. 
68.  "Noname – A new quarterly model for Belgium", by Ph. Jeanfils and K. Burggraeve, Research 
series, May 2005. 
69.  "Economic importance of the Flemish martime ports: report 2003", F. Lagneaux, Document 
series, May 2005. 
70. "Measuring inflation persistence: a structural time series approach", M. Dossche and 
G. Everaert, Research series, June 2005. NBB WORKING PAPER No. 84 - MAY 2006    53 
   
71.  "Financial intermediation theory and implications for the sources of value in structured finance 
markets", J. Mitchell, Document series, July 2005. 
72.  "Liquidity risk in securities settlement", J. Devriese and J. Mitchell, Research series, July 2005. 
73.  "An international analysis of earnings, stock prices and bond yields", A. Durré and P. Giot, 
Research series, September 2005. 
74.  "Price setting in the euro area: Some stylized facts from Individual Consumer Price Data", 
E.  Dhyne, L. J. Álvarez, H. Le Bihan, G. Veronese, D. Dias, J. Hoffmann, N. Jonker, 
P. Lünnemann, F. Rumler and J. Vilmunen, Research series, September 2005. 
75. "Importance économique du Port Autonome de Liège: rapport 2003", by F. Lagneaux, 
Document series, October 2005. 
76. "The pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area: new survey evidence, by S. Fabiani, 
M. Druant, I. Hernando, C. Kwapil, B. Landau, C. Loupias, F. Martins, T. Mathä, R. Sabbatini, 
H. Stahl and A. Stokman, Research series, November 2005. 
77.  "Income uncertainty and aggregate consumption, by L. Pozzi, Research series, 
November 2005. 
78.  "Crédits aux particuliers - Analyse des données de la Centrale des Crédits aux Particuliers", by 
H. De Doncker, Document series, January 2006. 
79.  "Is there a difference between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, why?" by 
P. Van Roy, Research series, February 2006. 
80. "A generalised dynamic factor model for the Belgian economy - Useful business cycle 
indicators and GDP growth forecasts", by Ch. Van Nieuwenhuyze, Research series, 
February 2006. 
81.  "Réduction linéaire de cotisations patronales à la sécurité sociale et financement alternatif" by 
Ph. Jeanfils, Ph. Delhez, L. Van Meensel, K. Burggraeve, K. Buysse, Ph. Du Caju, Y. Saks and 
K. Van Cauter, Document series, March 2006. 
82.  "The patterns and determinants of price setting in the Belgian industry" by D. Cornille and 
M. Dossche, Research series, May 2006. 
83. "A multi-factor model for the valuation and risk management of demand deposits" by 
H. Dewachter, M. Lyrio and K. Maes, Research series, May 2006. 
84.  "The single European electricity market: A long road to convergence" by F. Coppens and 
D. Vivet, Document series, May 2006. 